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INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND
CHEMICAL TOXICITY: DESIGNING LAWS
TQ PRODUCE AND USE DATA
Mary L. Lyndon*
INTRODUCTION

Just as laws may create entitlements to the use of information, they
may also be written to distribute information and to encourage information production. This Article discusses the ways in which law affects the generation and distribution of information related to
chemical exposure and toxicity. 1 It describes the economic impact of
recently enacted right-to-know laws2 and proposes that better and
• Associate Professor, St. John's University School of Law. B.A. 1969, Manhattanville College; J.D. 1974, Northeastern; LL.M. 19S7, Columbia; 1985 Julius Silver Fellow in Law, Science,
and Technology at Columbia University Law School. - Ed. The author thanks Harold S.H.
Edgar, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Frank P. Grad, Richard R. Nelson, Maxwell Gregg Bloche,
Daniel D. Polsby, and Howard A. Latin for their helpful comments on working drafts of this
Article.
1. Petroleum byproducts and derivatives, synthetic organic chemicals, and inorganic chemicals, including asbestos and heavy metals, are the categories of substances that pose the greatest
risks to health through occupational and environmental exposures. See Schroeder, A Decade of
Change in Regulating the Chemical Industry, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. l, 4-9 (Summer
1983). The manufacturing sector of the economy is the source of the bulk of the chemicals
introduced into the workplace, the environment, and consumer products. For example, OSHA
has determined that the manufacturing sector employs almost one third of the nation's workers,
but accounts for one half of chemically related occupational disease. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,285 (1983).
The industries within the manufacturing sector that are of the greatest concern are petroleum
firms and chemical producers. The term "chemical" will be used generically in this Article to
indicate both the products and wastes of these industries.
2. Federal law requiring dissemination of toxicity data for chemicals used in industry is contained primarily in two sources: (1) the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act of 1986 (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. IV 1986), which was enacted as Title III of the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 19&6 (SARA); and (2) the OSHA Hazard
Communication Standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1987). The EPA is currently completing regulations mandated by SARA. 52 Fed. Reg. 38,344 (1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 370); see
also M. KRIZ, CHEMICALS AND THE COMMUNITY: NEW LAW, NEW REsPONSIBILIDES (1987).
Earlier federal environmental and consumer protection statutes contain a variety of more
limited disclosure requirements. The EPA was directed by the Resources Conservation Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1982), to establish a hazardous waste management system which
includes a manifest system. In addition, pesticides must be labeled with their active ingredients
and a registration number, pursuant to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982). Products regulated pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act must be labeled with their ingredients. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). The Consumer
Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (1982), authorizes the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) to promulgate labeling requirements. Labeling of hazardous materials in transit has
been required by the U.S. Department of Transportation pursuant to the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1801 (1982).
Right-to-know laws adopt a more aggressive approach to the use of information than the
earlier statutes. They reach a broader segment of the population and require disclosure of all
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more abundant data could be produced if the law paid greater attention to basic economic principles that influence research and information systems.
Toxicity information is necessary for intelligent private choices, as
well as for the protection of public health. Yet the manufacturers and
industrial users of commercial chemicals have little incentive to produce and distribute data about chemicals' adverse side effects and, indeed, even the identity of these chemicals. Because generic product
trade names have been substituted in the public domain for more specific and informative chemical names, 3 it has been difficult for those
who use chemicals, or for third parties, to undertake the task of data
collection. As a result, the nature and extent of human exposure to
chemicals have been masked.
The relative invisibility of chemicals hampers the market's ability
to screen chemicals for toxicity and has hindered the development of
chemical information services. The lack of data has also handicapped
the scientific study of the health and environmental effects of industrial chemicals; and it has profoundly affected the law's attempt to
deter and to compensate for chemical harms. 4
known health effects of a chemical, an advance on the ingredient labeling approach that evolved
in the 1970s.
This Article uses the term "right-to-know law" to include the rules contained in the OSHA
Hazard Communication Standard. The two names may be read as having distinct conceptual
roots and very different implications which are not explored in this Article. See generally Baram,
The Right to Know and the Duty to Disclose Hazard Information, 74 AM. J. Pus. HEALTH 385
(1984); Note, A Duty to Warn, A Right to Know: Odgers v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation,
1986 DET. C. L. REv. 163; Note, Occupational Health Risks and the Worker's Right to Know, 90
YALE L.J. 1792 (1981) (making efficiency and normative arguments for the worker's right to
know).
3. Familiar consumer products such as Windex, Fantastic, and Drano are examples of chemical mixtures whose ingredients are unknown to their users. Commercial users of chemicals also
rely on trade names. The lack of more specific information abut these products can lead to their
misuse and hinder medical treatment of persons injured by exposure. See infra notes 40-41, 49.
4. There is an extensive literature on proposals for use of market incentives to reduce pollution. The lack of adequate toxicity data has been a recurring theme; but for the most part,
commentators have accepted the current lack of data as a part of the regulatory landscape and
worked around it. Two important exceptions are Schroeder & Shapiro, Responses to Occupational Disease: The Role of Markets, Regulation, and Information, 72 GEO. L.J. 1231 (1984)
(identifying lack of information as a key element in the failure to protect workers from occupational disease), and Latin, Environmental Deregulation and Consumer Decisionmaking Under
Uncertainty, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 187 (1982) (emphasizing that sound environmental decisionmaking requires extensive data not produced by an unregulated market) [hereinafter Latin,
Environmental Uncertainty]. See also Portney, Toxic Substance Policy and the Protection of
Human Health, in CURRENT ISSUES IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 105 (1978) (proposing
limited measures to cope with disincentives to information production).
The main focus of scholarly discussion has been whether and how to apply market incentives,
as opposed to "command and control" technology-based standards, to the control of pollution.
See, e.g.. Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards
and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985); Ackerman & Stewart,
Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985) (commenting on Latin); Stewart,
Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1985);
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Attempts to remedy the problem have, for the most part, consisted
of complex s_tatutory schemes which empower administrative agencies
to control various forms of pollution. A central challenge for regulators has been to strike an appropriate balance between the costs and
benefits of regulation. As risk assessment has assumed a more central
role in chemical regulation, uncertainty about chemicals' actual health
effects has become a dominant theme in the debate over whether, as a
society, we are spending too much or too little on pollution control. 5
Some of this uncertainty results from the slow evolution of toxicology
and the complexity of toxicology's findings; additionally, of course,
some uncertainty is inherent in the characteristics of chemical commerce and consumption. However, not all of the uncertainty is so
intractable; improved production and dissemination of toxicological
data would go far· to alleviate this problem. In a system such as ours,
which has increasingly relied upon health effects data to legitimize
controls, information strategies should be a central concern.
The 1980s have seen the emergence of right-to-know laws and the
Hazard Communication Standard of the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA). These laws trace their jurisprudential roots to the doctrine of informed consent and utilize the economic
principles incorporated in consumer protection regulation. They attempt to make better use of existing data by requiring its distribution
to chemical purchasers and workers, to local government officials,
and, under some circumstances, to the general public. This new availability of data should facilitate market mechanisms for differentiating
among the toxicity levels of different chemicals. But while right-toknow laws are an important advance in regulation, their accomplishments are likely to be limited, since they cover only a small proportion
of the relevant universe of chemicals in use. Moreover, the legal context in which they operate often works at cross purposes with information dynamics.
The analysis presented here suggests that the law can move beyond
Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF.
L. REV. 1256 (1981) [hereinafter Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law].
5. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 777-82 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (discussing "[t]he distinction between avoidance of risk through regulation and compensation for injuries after the fact"); Crandall & Lave, Introduction and Summary, in THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION 3-5 (1981); Samuels, The Uncertainty
Factor, in MANAGEMENT OF AssESSED RISK FOR CARCINOGENS 269 (W. Nicholson ed. 1981)
[hereinafter MANAGEMENT OF AsSESSED RISK]; Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The
Hazards ofPublic Risk Management in the Courts, 85 Cow~. L. REV. 277 (1985); Latin, Environmental Uncertainty, supra note 4; Schwartz, Product Liability, Corporate Structure, and
Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 689 (1985);
Shaven, Uncertainty Over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J. L. & EcoN.
587 (1985).
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disclosure provisions to become more fundamentally attuned to the
nature of the informational problem that underlies the regulatory costbenefit dilemma. If we think of information in a more explicitly economic framework, new options for the production and use of data begin to appear, ·including the intriguing possibility of a more robust
private market for toxicology. The legal system can be structured to
respond more fully to the possibilities of research and development in
this area.
Several developments support taking a fresh look at the problem.
Toxicology, computer science, and information management science
have matured considerably in the past two decades. 6 We can now produce more information about toxicity and manage the data much
more effectively than we could in the early 1970s, when the environmental regulatory scheme was first established. New environmental
technologies and service professions have evolved, and the short history of environmental regulation has provided experience with a variety of legal rules and systems. These conditions pave the way for a
more focused information strategy for toxics regulation. 7
Basic work in the economics of information provides us with some
tools with which to analyze the nature and behavior of data related to
chemicals. 8 Economists have produced an extensive literature on the
role of information in the market, examining the ways in which asymmetries of information affect market structure and product quality.
They have also described market responses to these asymmetries, including information pooling, advertising, and the development of
third-party providers of information. This Article draws on this work
to describe the. ways in which toxicity and exposure data are used,
6. See, e.g., H. PAGELS, THE DREAMS OF REASON - THE COMPUTER AND THE RISE OF
THE SCIENCES OF COMPLEXITY (1988); Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure
ofSecurities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REv. 747 (1985) (elaborating on the impact and opportunities of computer technology in securities regulation).
7. See 1 M. PORAT, THE INFORMATION ECONOMY: DEFINITION AND MANAGEMENT 8
(1977):
As information technologies "invade" various sectors of the economy, old arrangements
may come into conflict with the new. Applications of the new technologies may raise either
economic issues or value conflicts that previously lay dormant. The seeds of tomorrow's
opportunities and difficulties are sown today. And therein lies the presumption that infor·
mation policy should adopt a prospective look at future applications of information
technology.
8. See Joskow & Noll, Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview, in STUDIES IN PUB·
LIC REGULATION 1 (G. Fromm ed. 1981); R. BARTLETT & u. APTE, INFORMATION, UNCER·
TAINTY AND REGULATION IN ATTACKING REGULATORY PROBLEMS - AN AGENDA FOR
RESEARCH IN THE 1980'S 19-39 (1981); F. THOMPSON & L. JONES, REGULATORY POLICY AND
PRACTICES: REGULATING BETTER AND REGULATING BEST 67-84 (1982); THE REGULATION
GAME: How BRmSH AND WEST GERMAN COMPANIES BARGAIN WITH GOVERNMENT 12-13
(A. Peacock ed. 1984); Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69 AM.
EcoN. REv. 493 (1979).
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both in the market and in the legal system, and to explore ways in
which the law could concern itself with information in order to encourage optimal investments in chemical safety.
Part I describes the multiple uses of toxicity and exposure data.
The information can have value to many agents in the economy, in the
sciences, and in the law, since its production and distribution reduce a
variety of costs to individuals, firms, and government. This is data
that saves lives and reduces liability by making possible the prevention
and treatment of disease related to chemical exposure.
.
Part II addresses the market's failure to produce toxicity and exposure data. It identifies the reasons for the lack of data and discusses
the effects of this problem on the market for chemicals. Part III describes the effect the law has had on information production. It suggests that tort liability, administrative exposure standards, and
reporting requirements do not correct the market failure and may, in
fact, aggravate it. Direct government investment in data production
has been the most effective response, but this effort has not been substantial enough to cope with the numbers of chemicals that merit
study.
Part IV describes right-to-know laws. It suggests that, since the
permutations of the many chemicals in use ~d the types and 9ombinations of human exposures cannot be screened adequately by a central agency, polycentric decisionmaking is a logical development in
toxics control. Part V proposes to expand and improve ciata production with funding and planning modeled upon the Superfund and national contingency plan approach, now used for hazardous waste
cleanup. Linking public research costs to their private economic origins and opening up the possibilities for independent research could
encourage cost avoidance by the producers. of chemical products. Part
VI suggests that toxicity data collection and management should be
conducted according to principles that will foster: an accessible national data system, one which would be a resource analogous _to a, utility or common carrier service.
· .
· ·· .
The Article concludes, in Part VII, with some observations on the
functions of information in toxics control and the confusion .that
prev3:ils in the existing statutory scheme.

I.

THE USES OF TOXICITY AND EXPOSURE DATA

Worldwide production of organic chemicals ros·e from 7 million
metric tons in 1950 to about 250 million metric tons in 1985.9 Many
9. UNEP, Chemicals in International Trade, 17 ENVTL. POLY. & L. 66 (1987). Production
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of today's chemicals did not exist a decade or two ago, but are now
pervasive in the environment. 10 In the United States, chemicals are
handled in every sector of the economy and in every home. 11 They are
discharged into the environment in every medium, 12 and chemical acof synthetic organic chemicals in the United States rose from 1.3 billion pounds in 1940 to 320
billion pounds in 1978. R. NADER, R. BROWNSTEIN & J. RICHARD, WHO'S POISONING
AMERICA 5 (1981). A presidential panel reported a 581 % increase in production of synthetic
organic chemical products between 1949 and 1969. Production of raw materials and in·
termediates rose 1150% in the same period. Panel on Chemicals and Health, President's Science
Advisory Committee, CHEMICALS AND HEALTH 78 (1973) [hereinafter .CHEMICALS AND
HEALTH]. The panel calculated that the total amount of manufactured consumer organic chemi·
cals was 500 lbs. per capita. Id. at 27. Figures quoted by F.D. Hoerger, of the Dow Chemical
Company, are somewhat different: an increase in U.S. production of synthetic organic chemicals
from 4 billion pounds in 1940 to 228 billion pounds in 1979. Hoerger, Indicators of Exposure
Trends, in BANBURY REPORT 9: QUANTIFICATION OF OCCUPATIONAL CANCER 435, 438 (1981)
[hereinafter BANBURY REPORT 9]. See also Schroeder, supra note 1. However, aggregate pro·
duction figures may sometimes be misleading because chemicals do not all have the same health
impacts. Nor does the number of chemicals indicate the extent of human exposure. Seventy
percent of all chemicals in production in the United States have annual production volumes of
less than 100,000 pounds. Hoerger, supra, at 440.
JO. Figures vary on the number of chemicals now in use. In 1983, OSHA estimated that as
many as 575,000 chemical products might be in use, with hundreds of new ones introduced
annually. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,323 (1983). Pursuant to the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),
15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1982), the EPA reports that nearly 66,000 commercial chemical substances
have been identified by manufacturers or importers since 1975. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, TOXIC SUBSI'ANCES CONTROL ACT (TSCA): REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 1986, at 4 (1987) [hereinafter TSCA 1986 REPORT]; OFFICE OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE LAYMAN'S GUIDE TO THE TOXIC SUBSI'ANCES CONTROL
ACT 6 (1987) (EPA 560/1-87-011) [hereinafter LAYMAN'S GUIDE]. The National Research
Council has estimated that there are 65, 725 substances currently in use that are of possible toxicological concern. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOXICITY TESTING: STRATEGIES TO DE·
TERMINE NEEDS AND PRIORmES (1984) [hereinafter TOXICITY TESTING].
11. The average household uses a wide variety of hazardous substances, often as ingredients
of such products as toilet bowl cleaners, fabric softeners, spot removers, bleach, disinfectants,
polishes, and paint removers. M. GREENBERG & R. ANDERSON, HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 4
(1984).
EPA's five-year Total Exposure Assessment Methodology (TEAM) study of personal exposures has identified consumer products in the home as a potentially greater source of toxic exposure to volatile chemicals than outdoor sources. EPA Air Toxics Study Turns Up Surprises,
COMMUNITY RIGHT·TO·KNOW NEWS, Sept. 22, 1987, at 7-8. EPA has suggested that "[i]t
seems probable that consumer products (paints, cleaners, propellants, plastics, cosmetics, etc.)
and building materials (adhesives, fixers, resins, insulation, etc.) comprise the major source categories of exposure." Id. Davis, Bridbord & Schneiderman report, in Estimating Cancer Causes:
Problems in Methodology, Production, and Trends, in BANBURY REPORT 9, supra note 9, at 285,
296, report that it is difficult for epidemiologists to identify control groups that have had no
exposure.
12. Estimates of annual discharges into the environment are staggeringly high, but imprecise.
The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) recently found that, of 184 million metric tons of
air pollution emitted in the United States in 1984, between 4.5 and 24.7 million metric tons may
have been hazardous chemicals, although no national data are available. Water quality data for
conventional and toxic pollutants do not indicate what is being discharged, only what industries
are permitted to discharge. Earlier OTA research determined that between 255 to 275 million
metric tons of hazardous waste are generated annually - about one ton per citizen. OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, SERIOUS REDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 152 (1986). See
also CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH (1981); infra note 214, concerning the new national inventory of toxic discharges being compiled by the EPA pursuant to
the EPCRA.
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cidents or "sudden uncontrolled releases" have become commonplace.13 As production has burgeoned, new chemical measurement
technologies have revealed the presence of small amounts of toxic and
potentially toxic substances throughout the environment and population.14 For example, numerous suspected carcinogens are found in urban air and drinking water. 15 In addition, chemical exposures have
been linked to numerous diseases besides cancer. 16
Two characteristics of many chemical-related diseases shape the
basic informational issues in toxicity regulation. First, it appears that
many diseases may be caused by more than one kind of exposure; relatively few marker or signature symptoms have been identified to connect particular diseases with particular chemicals. Moreover, people
vary in their susceptibility and their exposure history, although most
people are now exposed to a variety of chemicals. Second, when lowlevel exposures cause a disease, the effect is often not apparent for
13. See R. Abrams, Toxic Chemical Accidents in New York State: The Risk of Another
Bhopal 2, A-5 to A-6 (1986) (unpublished report by N.Y. Attorney General citing an average of
five reported accidents in that state each week from January 1983 through November 1985, many
involving large companies); T. WHITESIDE, THE PENDULUM AND THE TOXIC CLOUD - THE
COURSE OF DIOXIN CONTAMINATION (1979).
14. E.g., Damaged Wildlife Shows Pollution Still Plagues Great Lakes. N.Y. Times, July 12,
1988, at C4, col. 1.
15. David P. Rall, Director of the National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences,
reported in 1979 that "it appears probable that the United States population is exposed to low
concentrations of many different carcinogens, and that the summation of many low-level chemical insults yields the current 16-percent death rate from cancer." Rall, Validity of Extrapolation
of Results of Animal Studies to Man, in PUBLIC CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
HAZARDS 85, 91 (E. Hammond & I. Selikoff eds. 1979). But see Peto, Distorting the Epidemiology of Cancer: The Need for a More Balanced Overview, 284 NATURE 297 (Mar. 27, 1980).
16. Cancer is the second most common cause of death in the United States. In 1983, more
than 440,000 Americans died of cancer. NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT ON CARCINOGENS 5 (1985) [hereinafter FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT ON CARCINOGENS]. A high percentage of
cancers are now thought to be caused by "environmental factors," but the term "environment"
in this context means "anything that interacts with humans, including substances eaten, drunk,
and smoked, natural and medical radiation, workplace exposures, drugs, aspects of sexual behavior and substances in air, water, and soil." Id. The FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT ON CARCINOGENS, supra, listed 148 carcinogenic agents; of these, 113 were industrial products or
occupational exposures, including 13 pesticides, 33 industrial chemicals and by-products, 20 dyes
and pigments, 14 combustion products, 7 solvents, 6 metals, and 6 analytical and research chemicals. Id. at 3-4.
Suspected carcinogens comprise a much larger group, but the bases of suspicion vary with the
data and the authors of the estimates. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) is charged with the responsibility oflisting toxic substances. 29 U.S.C. §§ 669(a)(l6),
669(e), 671 (1982). In 1973, NIOSH listed more than 25,000 entries, involving 11,000 different
substances. More than 2,400 of these were identified a5 suspected carcinogens. NATIONAL INST.
FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SUSPECTED CARCINOGENS: A SUBFILE OF THE NIOSH REGISTRY OF TOXIC EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES ix (2d ed. 1976). Other lists of suspected carcinogens have also been prepared
and these vary greatly in length. In addition, while cancer has been the disease of greatest public
concern, chemical exposures have been linked to other types of health damage, including acute
toxic effects and neurological problems. See infra notes 40-41, 49.
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some time. Indeed, some diseases, such as cancer, have latency periods of several decades. Consequently, the individual causal event
often passes unnoticed or is, in fact, a series of exposures which are
relatively unremarkable in themselves.
Scientists approach the problem by developing statistical estimates
of the likelihood of causal connections between a chemical and a disease. They gather data from human populations exposed to a chemical, particularly in the workplace, to produce epidemiological studies,
and they subject living cells and animals to exposures in controlled
laboratory tests. Animal studies are commonly called bioassays. Toxicity data can then be used to estimate the health risks posed to
broader human populations exposed to the same chemical.17
Both toxicity and exposure data are basic components of health
risk assessments. 18 The supply of this information guides the course of
research and chemical regulation and its scarcity shapes the entire system. This health data is also used in medical treatment and research,
government planning and regulation, insurance, industrial hygiene,
and corporate product development and production. Data is accumulating and our understanding of the biological mechanisms at work in
disease is growing. However, research on chemical health effects has
not kept pace with chemical production and dissemination.
In 1984, the National Research Council of the National Academy
of Scienc~s issued a report, Toxicity Testing - Strategies to Determine
Needs and Priorities, 19 evaluating the nation's need for information on
chemical exposure and its health effects. The Council determined
that, for the great majority of chemicals, information essential for hazard assessment is lacking. · Of the chemicals sampled by the Council,
there were adequate data to make a full risk assessment of only 10% of
pesticides, 2% of cosmeticingredients, 5% of food additives, and 18%
of drug ingredients. 2° For a higher percentage of these materials there
17. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983); Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic
Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. REG. 89 (1988). See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
. 18. COMMITTEE ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR AsSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUBLIC
HEALTH, COMMN. ON LIFE SCIENCES, NATL. RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK AssESSMENT JN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 19-20 (1983) [hereinafter RISK ASSESS·
MENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT].
19. See TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at ix, 19.
20. See id. at 12.· The study first identified a "select universe" consisting of 65, 725 substances
that are of possible concern to the National Toxicology Program because of their potential for
human exposure. Id. at 33. Through a random sampling process, it then selected a subset of 675
substances covering seven categories. Id. at 43-44. These were (1) pesticides and inert ingredients; (2) cosmetic ingredients; (3) drugs and excipients; (4) food additives, and three groups of
chemicals in commerce: (5) those produced in quantities of one million pounds per year or more;
(6) those produced 'in quantities of fewer than one million pounds per year; and (7) those chemi-
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were at least minimal data available upon which a limited assessment
could be made: 15% for food additives, 21 % for drugs, 24% for cosmetics, and 26% for pesticides.21 Most striking was the Council's conclusion that no information at all is available on the toxicity of
approximately 80% of the 48,000 chemical substances in general commercial use. The Council concluded, "Although it can be convincingly argued that many chemicals do not need to be tested, because of
their low potential for human exposure or for toxic activity, it is clear
that thousands or even tens of thousands of chemicals are legitimate
candidates for toxicity testing related to a variety of health effects." 22
The need for exposure data is also quite acute. The most basic
exposure data generally have been unavailable or unassembled. 23 In
Toxicity Testing, the National Research Council emphasized that the
shortage of exposure data is an obstacle to producing adequate toxicity
cals for which production quantities were unknown. Id. at 38. The seventh category (for which
there was no information regarding production quantity) was almost as large as categories (5)
and (6) combined. A subsample of 100 chemicals, about which there was at least some minimal
toxicity information, was selected and examined in depth to determine the availability of toxicity
information. Id. at 43-50.
Another source estimates that fewer than 1% of the chemicals in routine use have been partially tested and that synergisms are virtually ignored. F. THOMPSON & L. JONES, supra note 8,
at 213. The inadequacy of available data is routinely ackflowledged by government agencies as a
condition of and a constraint on regulation. See, e.g., OSHA's Hazard Communication Standards, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200, app. A (1988).
21. See TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 12; CHEMICALS AND HEALTH, supra note 9, at
87-100.
.
The differences in data supply for drugs, pesticides, and "chemicals in commerce" reflect
different legal requirements for testing of these groups of chemicals. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 342(a),
348, 355 (1982) (food, drugs, and cosmetics) and 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982) (pesticides) require ex
ante testing, while the toxics provisions of environmental and occupational health statutes do
not. See infra text accompanying notes 87-92 (comparing and explaining ex ante and ex post
regulation).
22. TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 14. The report did not specifically address the
further problem of identifying effects of exposure to multiple pollutants or to mixtures of pollutants, though the state of present knowledge of cumulative and subadditive effects is quite limited. See F. THOMPSON & L. JONES, supra note 8, at 213.
23. TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 13, 16, 51-53, 73, 123-24. The National Toxicology
Program publishes an annual report to Congress on carcinogens and exposure to them. In 1985,
it stated:
Several problems are encountered in developing the information required for the Annual
Reports on Carcinogens. Estimating the number of people potentially exposed to a substance and identifying the nature, route, and intensity of this potential exposure are difficult
tasks. It is often impossible to obtain accurate production volume and use_patterns for most
chemicals.
FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT ON CARCINOGENS, supra note 16, at 1.
Potential exposure data have generally been drawn from publicly _available descriptions of
manufacturing processes, general industrial literature, and more recently, reports to regulatory
agencies. See, e.g., P. BARTH & H. HUNT, WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORK RELATED
ILLNESSES AND .DISEASES 55-60 (1980) (detailing the very rough estimates of exposure relied
upon by OSHA). Employment duration and job categories are also used as rough measures of
exposure. See Landrigan, Melius, Rinsky & Thum, Approaches to the Estimation of Exposure in
Occupational Epidemiology, in BANBURY REPORT 19: RISK QUANTIFICATION AND REGULATORY POLICY 65 (1985).
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assessments. 24 The report concluded: "In view of the great importance of exposure data and indexes of hazard assessment and the
nearly complete absence of such data, the committees recommend that
planning begin for the development of much more extensive, detailed,
and accurate data bases than now exist for exposure assessments. " 25
Current data describing which chemicals are being used and where
they are being used often support only rough estimates. 26 Epidemiologists have repeatedly called for improved linkage of databases and
records to facilitate exposure estimates. 27 An essential part of such
linkage is the distribution of chemical identity data. 28
Identification of chemical substances is a precondition to effective
study of toxics. 29 Chemicals may be closely related in structure and
24. TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 124. Several committees of the National Academy
of Sciences, as well as other health agencies that have surveyed the problem of inadequate toxicity data, have reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g.• RISK AsSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOV·
ERNMENT, supra note 18, at 150; FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT ON CARCINOGENS, supra note 16,
at 1-2; INST. OF MEDICINE, NATL. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, COSTS OF ENVIRONMENT-RE·
LATED HEALTH EFFECTS: A PLAN FOR CONTINUING STUDY 50 (1981) [hereinafter COSTS
STUDY]; CHEMICALS AND HEALTH, supra note 9, at 1-2.
25. TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 124.
26. See U.S. EPA Guidelines for Estimating Exposures, 51 Fed. Reg. 34,042, 34,046 (1986)
[hereinafter Estimating Exposures]; TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 123. Several kinds of
information that would be useful in developing exposure data are unavailable. There are great
variations in the quantities of chemicals produced and the context in which they are used. Some
have short lifespans in the market (the average is five years). CHEMICALS AND HEALTH, supra
note 9, at 108. Many are produced in limited quantities, reducing extended exposure but also
making it difficult to determine toxic effects. Seventy-five percent of all chemicals in production
in the United States have annual production volumes ofless than 100,000 pounds. LYNDON B.
JOHNSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, POLICY RESEARCH PROJECT No. 50, THE TOXIC SUB·
STANCES CONTROL ACT: OVERVIEW AND EVALUATION 121 (1982) [hereinafter TSCA: OVER·
VIEW AND EVALUATION]; see also Hoerger, supra note 9, at 439-40. Annual production volume
figures are not available for many chemicals in commercial use. There is also a great variation in
the numbers of people who are exposed to each chemical, the forms of exposure, and the reac·
tions to exposure. CHEMICALS AND HEALTH, supra note 9, at 27-28.
The National Research Council's exposure estimates for food, drugs, cosmetics, and pesticides were based on the intended uses of the products. The Council based its environmental and
occupational exposure estimates on "production volumes, environmental fate, and disposal
data," but found that "few data of these types were available." TOXICITY TESTING, supra note
10, at 73.
27. Where possible chemical exposures are known, the epidemiological study can proceed to
identify the possible effects from this exposure:
[W]e have found that it is far more efficient and useful to approach the problem from the
point of view of exposure. Hence, the name of the game is to first answer the question "To
what chemicals are members of the population exposed?" and only after this has been an·
swered, go on to the question of "What effects might we expect from such exposure?".
Searching for exposures to chemicals of known toxicity may be more dramatic and more fun
but, in the long run, it is less profitable.
Fisher, Information Required for Decision Making: Early Warning and Forecasting, in SYMPO·
SIUM ON THE HANDLING OF TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION 148, 149 (1976).
28. See infra Part IV.
29. Chemical identity is the starting point for any activity that evaluates chemical health
effects. See, e.g., Estimating Exposures, supra note 26, at 34,042, 34,046; U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM: REVIEW OF CURRENT DHHS, DOE,
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yet have very different health impacts. 3° For instance, benzene and
toluene are very similar in molecular structure, but only benzene has
been shown to cause leukemia in humans. Disclosure of chemical
identity is the starting point for establishing the fact of exposure and
determining and preventing adverse effects.
Recognizing the need to identify and study chemicals' health impact, Congress enacted the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) in
1976. 31 The TSCA directs the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to maintain an inventory of all chemicals in use and to screen
new chemicals for risks before they enter the environment. In 1978,
the National Toxicology Program (NTP) was established within the
Department of Health and Human Services to coordinate federal toxicological research. 32 And in 1980, the Agency for Toxic Substances
Disease Registry (ATSDR) was mandated by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
to manage data related to hazardous waste sites. 33 Additional authority and appropriations for study are scattered throughout the statutory
scheme; but these legislative responses, discussed more fully below,
have not produced data at a satisfactory rate.
While the government and the private sector produce data, the
management and distribution expenditures of both are difficult to
quantify. 34 In fiscal year 1987, the federal government allocated $210
AND EPA RESEARCH RELATED TO TOXICOLOGY, FISCAL YEAR 1987 (toxicology testing organized by chemical name and CAS number) [hereinafter NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM: REVIEW]; TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 185, 191; OSHA Proposed Hazard Communication
Rules, 47 Fed. Reg. 12,092, 12,105 (1982) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910) (proposed Mar.
19, 1982) (identity information is an essential element in a hazard communication system).
Collection and coordination of data is an increasingly important dimension of regulation, see
infra text accompanying note 171. Several toxics data coordination schemes, including the Interagency Toxic Substances Data Committee and the Chemical Substances Information Network,
are described in LAYMAN'S GUIDE, supra note 10, at 9. See also COSTS STUDY, supra note 24, at
37-38 (describing federal information systems and data related to environmental hazards and
human exposure); TOXIC CHEMICALS AND PUBLIC PROTECTION: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES STRATEGY COMMITTEE 21-33 (1980) [hereinafter TOXIC
CHEMICALS AND PUBLIC PROTECTION].
.
30. TSCA: OVERVIEW AND EVALUATION, supra note 26, at 47-48.
31. 15 u.s.c. § 2601 (1982).
32. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL TOXICOLOGICAL PROGRAM:
FISCAL YEAR 1987 ANNUAL PLAN 1 (1987). See generally NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM:
REVIEW, supra note 29.
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9061, 9064(i) (1982). The agency began to operate only in 1983.
34. NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM: REVIEW, supra note 29, at 4, reports that $156
million was allocated to chemical testing and $54 million to toxicological methods development.
In 1980, the NTP budget was $65.7 million and in 1988 it was $79.1 million (or $48 million in
1980 dollars). For fiscal year 1972, the President's Science Advisory Committee reported that
the federal effort in environmental health research amounted to $98 million, not counting research on biological disease agents and on ionizing and electromagnetic radiation. CHEMICALS
AND HEALTH, supra note 9, at 88.
State spending on scientific research in general is considerably less than federal spending. In
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million for toxicological research, but in real dollars, the budget for
chemical testing was smaller than the 1980 budget. 35 The benefits of
these expenditures are limited further by the fact that most government data management has been conducted within individual agencies
with limited data distribution. 36 Figures on private research expenditures are hard to come by, and the National Research Council found
little private data available to assist it in preparing its 1984 report. 37
Moreover, much private data held by the government is treated as
confidential and was not released to the Council. 38 The Council noted
that this private data, therefore, "did not exist" for purposes of toxicity screening. 3 9
Present levels of data production are insufficient to meet the needs
of a variety of uses. For instance, because of the absence of information about chemical exposures that might otherwise explain symptoms, doctors may have to use risky or harmful diagnostic procedures
and remedies. Dr. James Robins, of the Harvard School of Public
Health, has described examples of the difficulties faced by occupational health professionals in treating their patients:
I saw a worker with severe progressive lung disease ... caused by beryllium metal or a non-work-related disease called sarcoidosis. If beryllium
fiscal year 1977, the states together spent $600 million on all research and development; federal
expenditures were more than $20 billion. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT IN STATE AND LoCAL GOVERNMENTS, FISCAL YEAR 1977, DETAILED STATIS·
TICAL TABLES 1 (1978); U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSES:
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 1978, at 306.
Private sector research conducted by individual companies is especially difficult to quantify.
Some research has been supported on a cooperative basis. The Chemical Industry Institute of
Toxicology was formed in 1974 by 36 companies. In 1983, it had a budget of approximately $10
million and had conducted long-term studies on eight chemicals and was working on seven
others. See Hoerger, Beamer & Hanson, The Cumulative Impact of Health, Environmental, and
Safety Concerns on the Chemical Industry During the Seventies, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59,
73-74 (Summer 1983) (describing several joint industry research projects).
35. See supra note 34. The number of new toxicity and carcinogenicity starts has also decreased, from 40 prechronic and 44 carcinogenicity studies started in 1980 to 28 prechronic and
10 carcinogenicity studies started in 1988. See Letter to the author from Ernest E. McConnell,
D.V.M., National Inst. of Envtl. Health Sciences (July l, 1988) (on file with the Michigan Law
Review) [hereinafter McConnell Letter].
36. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssESSMENT, INFORMING THE NATION: FEDERAL INFORMA•
...,.,TION DISSEMINATION IN AN ELECTRONIC AGE 29 (1988) [hereinafter INFORMING THE
NATION).
37. See supra note 34. The authors of Toxicity Testing sought the assistance of firms and
trade associations in a health assessment of 40 chemicals in commerce selected for study, but
received only partial responses. The industry information which was secured was largely organized in a way that made it difficult to retrieve pertinent data. TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10,
at 194-96. When private research and development figures are publicly available, research on
substance side effects is typically not separated from total research and development. See CHEM·
ICALS AND HEALTH, supra note 9, at 89-90.
38. See infra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing protection of trade secrets).
39. TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 53.
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was the cause, the proper treatment was removal from further exposure
while, on the other hand, the treatment for sarcoidosis was corticosteroids. Corticosteroid treatment is associated with potentially severe side
effects including diabetes, cataracts, fractured bones, and infections.
Thus it was medically necessary to know whether the worker had been
exposed to beryllium at work. But in the absence of a right-to-know law,
I was unable to obtain this information from an uncooperative employer
fearful of a compensation suit. As a consequence the worker had to undergo a painful and potentially dangerous operation to remove a piece of
lung for beryllium analysis. 40

Medical research and reporting also rely upon identifying the nature
of chemical exposures.41 The links between the causes of occupational
disease and disease in the broader community can only be established
or studied if better information is available. 42 One of the early steps of
epidemiological studies, the phase in which an "informed hunch" develops, is often handicapped by poor identification of the class of persons exposed to specific chemicals.43 The lack of information also
40. Testimony of James Robins, M.D., before the Massachusetts Joint Committee on Health
Care, Mar. 9, 1983. In the same testimony, Dr. Robins reports another story:
As another example, a patient was seen with fever and a chest X-ray sugg~ting pneumonia. The patient had been cutting barrels containing an unknown substance with a blow
torch prior to becoming ill. The worker knew only the trade name on the barrel label. We
were unable to track down the generic chemical name in a prompt manner. Therefore antibiotics were administered because it was felt that the patient had typical pneumonia caused
by bacteria. Later, after much leg work, we discovered that the barrel had contained a
teflon-like compound that was known to cause a pneumonia-like illness when heated. Thus,
antibiotics had been improper treatment.
·
Dr. Robins has estimated that more than half of the time spent by occupational health professionals evaluating patients suspected of being ill from chemical exposure is pevoted to tracking
down the names of chemicals for which the worker can give only a brand name. Id.
41. Medical diagnosis of chemical diseases may be made difficult or impossible because of an
inability to connect symptoms with chemical exposures. For example,
[i]n the Vesicol Chemical plant in Bayport, Texas ... workers were being exposed to a
number of neurotoxic agents, including a highly hazardous pesticide called Leptophos. Various workers had experienced neurological symptoms and sought treatment from their personal physicians. A number of them were independently diagnosed as having encephalitis
or multiple sclerosis because their symptoms and clinical examinations were thought to be
consistent with these disorders. According to NIOSH investigators, there are subtle differences in the symptoms and type of nerve damage resulting from pesticide poisoning rather
than these diseases, but encephalitis and multiple sclerosis could mimic those caused by
neurotoxic chemicals encountered in the workplace. Since the sick workers had been seen
by different physicians who may not have been able to elicit a good occupational history,
and since appropriate toxicological information about the relevant workplace chemicals
might not have been immediately available to the attending physicians, it is not surprising
that the diagnosis of encephalitis or multiple sclerosis was considered rather than pesticide
poisoning.
OSHA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS AND REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS OF THE HAZARD COMMUNICATION STANDARD, at 11-24 (1983)
[hereinafter FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS]; see also P. BARTH & H. HUNT, supra
note 23, at 86-89.
42. Davis, Bridbord & Schneiderman, supra note 11, at 296, point out that for many workplace exposures, there is no way to identify an unexposed control group because the chemicals
are present in products and environmental pollution to which the general population is also
exposed.
43. See, e.g., Austin, An Industry-Sponsored Mortality Surveillance Program, in BANBURY
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means that chemically related diseases are likely to be underreported. 44
The costs of the lack of this information are often ignored because
concepts of the value of information are not incorporated into decisionmaking. 45 Among these costs are the prevention of pollution
treatment, cure, convalescence, and rehabilitation; costs attributable to
pain and suffering; loss of income on future earnings; adverse effects
on productivity; loss of tax revenues resulting from decreases in earnings and productivity; costs to welfare and unemployment compensation systems and government programs of health benefits; and other
related direct and indirect costs.46 The National Academy of Sciences
Institute of Medicine has identified some indirect and related costs.
These include nonhealth sector costs, direct costs borne by individuals
and their families (e.g., relocating, household help, special diet and
physical care, counseling), and losses from depressed value of property
damaged by pollution. 47
Toxicity and exposure data thus have numerous scientific, medical,
and economic uses. The government uses this information to set exposure standards and to assess the benefits of regulation. The lack of
REPORT 9, supra note 9, at 347; Beebe, Record Linkage and Needed Improvements in Existing
Data Resources, in BANBURY REPORT 9, supra note 9, at 661; Hoar, Epidemiology and Occupational Classification Systems, in BANBURY REPORT 9, supra note 9, at 455. Epidemiologists are
particularly constrained by lack of exposure data. S. EPSTEIN, POLITICS OF CANCER 41 (1978).
44. Only two to three percent of all workers' compensation payments are made for occupational illness, and one third of these are for minor ailments, such as skin rashes. Schroeder &
Shapiro, supra note 4. The 1980 Bureau of Labor Statistics Supplementary Data System noted
only 234 workers' compensation awards for cancer. This figure contrasts sharply with estimates
for asbestos-related cancers, which alone range from 4000 to 12,000 per year.
Another factor that compounds this difficulty is that most doctors have not been educated on
chemical risks, although the percentage has been rapidly increasing. See Levy, The Teaching of

Occupational Health in United States Medical Schools: Five Year Follow-Up of an Initial Survey,
75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 79, 79-80 (1985). The National Academy of Sciences' Institute of
Medicine recently reported that most family doctors are inadequately trained to recognize and
treat illnesses that stem from unhealthy home or work environments. Gap Found in Averting
Workplace Diseases, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1988, at Cl2, col. 4.
45. See TOXICITY TESTING, supra note IO, at 295-96. Much publicly supported toxicity research has not been specifically aimed at producing data immediately useful to decisionmakers.
As the National Research Council has noted, "[t]he concept of the value of information is an
important contribution to systematic priority-setting.... [T]he 'cost' of not knowing the degree
of toxicity of a chemical (or the degree of human exposure to it) lies in misclassifying its hazard
- e.g., believing it is innocuous, when it is actually toxic." ToXI CITY TESrING, supra note 10, at
15.
In Appendix E to its report, the Council explores the ramifications of an error of judgment as
to toxicity of a substance. It concludes that the costs of underestimating toxicity are likely to be
greater than the costs of overestimating and establishing regulatory controls. See TOXICITY
TESrING, supra note 10, app. at 363-79 ("The Costs of Misclassification").
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-96 (1982). See generally Health Services Research, Health Statistics,
and Health Care Technology Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-623, 92 Stat. 3443 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
47. See generally COSTS STUDY, supra note 24.
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solid information undermines the credibility of the government's risk
assessments and makes it difficult for consumers or employers to make
intelligent and informed decisions. 48 Insurers, employers, and unions
can also use exposure and toxicity data to reduce liability and occupational health problems.49 Consumers and consumer service organizations could use the information to evaluate products, if it were
available in sufficient quantity and in appropriate format.
Once the information is collected, it has the characteristics of a
"public good": that is, it becomes a good whose consumption by one
user does not diminish its availability or benefit to any other user.
Also, it can be transferred relatively easily and used in a variety of
contexts. This flexibility means that it can be very productive at a low
marginal cost, once the initial investment is made. 50
While there is disagreement over the adequacy of our current level
of investment in toxicity data collection, there is a consensus that the
48. One reason for the success of EPA's lead phase-down program under the Clean Air Act,
in spite of intense industry and OMB opposition, was that the estimated population exposure
used "real information." School systems and local public health boards had accumulated very
substantial records of exposure to lead, using regular school blood tests.
49. Chemical awareness and information could have prevented the following incident:
On August 20, 1975, Ted Phillips died while working in an unventilated pit. The employer
had given him a bucket of solvent from a drum labeled only with the trade name "axothene." Several hours after Ted Phillips entered the pit, the foreman went to look for him
and found his body. "Axothene" is methyl chloroform, which in high concentrations causes
dizziness, unconsciousness, and eventual death. It can also trigger heart attack by interfering with the system controlling the heartbeat. Apparently, Ted Phillips became dizzy and
spilled the solvent. Not knowing the danger he was in, he got a second bucket and reentered
the pit. Methyl chloroform evaporates quickly; the concentration in the pit was fatal.
FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 41, at II-24.
Some "downstream" manufacturers, who purchase chemicals to use in their production
processes, have been vocal in supporting dissemination of chemical identity and health effects
data. Both downstream employers and unions participating in OSHA's hazard communication
rulemaking proceeding generally opposed strict protective measures for trade secrets, questioning
the seriousness of the economic threat posed by access to them. For example, a representative of
the American Paper Institute stated:
A manufacturer should not be allowed to withhold the chemical identity of any chemical
which "contributes substantially" to the hazards of a mixture and for which there is a need
to know the specific chemical identity in order to provide a safe workplace. Downstream
employers, for example, may need to know the specific chemical identity of an ingredient in
order to monitor the level of airborne contaminants.
American Paper Inst., Exhibit 1973, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,313 (1983). A representative of the Caterpillar Tractor Company stated:
We feel that the latitude provided chemical manufacturers in identifying most chemicals
by the broad generic chemical classification will substantially hinder the efforts of safety and
health professionals to determine the requirements for safe usage of specific products....
We feel the benefits to be derived in fully disclosing the constituents of a hazardous material
far outweigh the risk (real or imagined) that may be incurred by chemical manufacturers as
a result of disclosing this information.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., Exhibit 19-201, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,313 (1983).
50. See Barry & Hardin, Introduction, in RATIONAL MAN AND IRRATIONAL SOCIETY? 181
(B. Barry & R. Hardin eds. 1982). Technical information, like any technical good, is rendered
more useful and more flexible if it is enhanced by combination and interpretation.
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data are useful. Since this illformation has many useful applications,
why does the market not produce it?

II.

DISINCENTIVES TO DATA PRODUCTION

The market for chemicals will not produce and distribute data on
toxicity and exposure unless an incentive structure is developed and
maintained. Several factors work to prevent the current system from
providing such incentives.
The dearth of toxicity data is in part due to the "public good"
nature of the information. 51 The virtues of flexibility and ease of
transfer that characterize public goods become liabilities in commerce,
because public goods cannot easily be held for exclusive use. If only
one person "buys" the information, others may still benefit; the costs
of producing the data cannot be recouped by multiple individual sales.
Because public goods are difficult to own and to control, the market
produces them at lower levels than may be desirable.
Information is an especially problematic public good, because purchasers do not know its value until it has been acquired. 52 Research is
affected by this dynamic. It is also a risky investment because one
cannot know ahead of time whether the effort will yield anything of
value. In spite of these handicaps, research and development are traditionally a major area of investment. Private research has been supported by legal protections, such as copyright and patent law.
Cost-reducing inventions are one kind of information likely to be
produced privately. But toxicological data has a less ready marketability than many cost-saving inventions. It has value only to those
who bear the costs that it reduces. Since even the individual victims of
chemical-related disease can rarely identify its specific cause, little demand has developed for assurance of safe or low-risk chemical
products. 53
A further disincentive to private research is the fact that the information produced is often inexact. Toxicologists currently have three
basic tools with which to gather data: laboratory cell analyses, bioas51. See Barry & Hardin, Individual Actions and Collective Consequences, in RATIONAL MAN
AND IRRATIONAL SOCIETY?, supra note 50, at 31-33; Joskow & Noll, supra note 8, at 26; F.
MACHLUP, THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE UNITED STATES 28
(1962) ("The production of knowledge is, for the greater part, not guided by the market
mechanism.").
52. See Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 615 (1962).
53. See P. Landrigan & S. Markowitz, Occupational Disease in New York State 17 (Feb.
1987) (Report to N.Y. State Legislature) ("workers often are not aware of or cannot remember
their exposure to dangerous materials").
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says, and epidemiology. Each has strengths and weaknesses that support different levels of confidence in their results.
The cheapest and easiest methodology is laboratory analysis of the
effects of a chemical on the DNA of cell cultures or on bacteria, yeast,
or fruit fiies.s 4 If a chemical causes a change in a cell's DNA, it is
considered a mutagen. However, while mutagenicity and carcinogenicity are statistically related, this kind of test is not reliable enough to
provide a basis for human exposure decisions. ss
The bioassay is the most controversial tool of toxicologists. Protocols for laboratory testing for carcinogenicity establish procedures for
exposing animals to controlled high doses of chemicals, but the application of animal test data to humans has been the center of heated
debate over the validity of inferences drawn from these studies. s6 So
far, accumulating test experience demonstrates that most chemicals
proved by epidemiological studies to be human carcinogens also cause
cancer in animals.s 7 However, the reverse is not clear: since human
data is available for few chemicals, only limited confirmation of animal
test results is possible. ss
54. See COSTS STUDY, supra note 24, at 51.
55. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, IDENTIFYING AND REGULATING CARCINOGENS 164-66 (1987) [hereinafter REGULATING CARCINOGENS]; see also Ames, Identifying Environmental Chemicals Causing Mutations and Cancer, 204 SCIENCE 587 (1979). Laboratory cell
analysis is often cited as the type of methodological breakthrough necessary to cope with screening the large number of untested chemicals. Research on basic cell functions includes NIEHS
work in the role of oncogenes in the carcinogenesis process. New developments in understanding
the disease process will speed toxicity screening, but the outcome of this research is still uncertain. Allison, Current Trends in Toxicological Research, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON TOXICOLOGY: TOXICOLOGY AS A PREDICTIVE SCIENCE 387 (G. PJaa
& w. Duncan eds. 1978) [hereinafter TOXICOLOGY AS A PREDICTIVE SCIENCE]. Even if speedy,
inexpensive screening devices were available, exposure data would still be necessary. TOXICITY
TESTING, supra note 10, at 7.
56. See e.g., Health Effects Testing Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 798.1100 (1987); see also Rall,
Validity of Extrapolation of Results of Animal Studies to Man, in PUBLIC CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 15, at 85 passim (arguing that animal test data
apply to humans). But see Breslow, Comment: Risk Assessment: Science or Policy?, 3 STAT. Sci.
28 (Feb. 1988); Freedman & Zeise!, From Mouse-to-Man: The Quantitative Assessment of Cancer
Risks, 3 STAT. SCI. 3 (Feb. 1988).
.
57. S. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 59.
58. Therefore, we do not have a firm sense of the extent to which animal tests may be underestimating or overestimating disease for humans. Samuel Epstein notes that few epidemiological
studies have been done on substances found to be carcinogens in rodents. The Jack of this particular type of data is sometimes spoken of as evidence of noncarcinogenicity in humans. Some
industry representatives have argued that regulation should primarily, if not exclusively, be directed at the few carcinogens identified by human epidemiologic studies. Epstein cites a reductio
ad absurdum put forward by Vaun Newill, Medical Director of Exxon Corporation:
A regulatory program based on experimental screening models to evaluate new chemicals
prior to their introduction into the environment, however, will hinder the better documentation of this correlation [between human and animal carcinogenicity data] than we have presently. When a carcinogen is prevented from entering the environment on the basis of
screening results, there can be no data regarding that exposure in man.
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Epidemiology is the science of statistical correlation of human exposure and disease symptoms to indicate the prevalence of disease in
an exposed group. 5 9 Epidemiologists most often study industrial
workplace settings, in an effort to get a focused look at more intensive
levels of exposure than occur in the general population. 60 But even in
work settings, epidemiological data suffer from many confounding factors, including multiple exposures, undetermined exposures, and poor
record-keeping. 61 Also, the latency periods of some diseases are
twenty years or more, longer than many chemicals have been in use. 62
However, while it is of limited sensitivity and cannot easily detect low
incidences of disease, epidemiology may confirm human carcinogenicity. 63
Epidemiological studies and bioassays are both costly. 64 Moreover, the cost of an individual bioassay has risen dramatically during
the past decade. 65 Firms will be reluctant to make substantial invest-

s. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 59 (quoting 29 CANCER BULLETIN 177-78 (1977)); see also REGULATING CARCINOGENS, supra note 55, at 166-67.
59. See E. CALABRESE, METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO DERIVING ENVIRONMENTAL
AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH STANDARDS 4 (1978); G. FRIEDMAN, PRIMER OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 8-10 (1980); A. LILIENFELD, FOUNDATIONS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 13 (1976). For surveys of
the results of recent epidemiological work, see Davis, Bridbord & Schneiderman, supra note 11,
at 290-91; Selikolf, Constraints in Estimating Occupational Contributions to Current Cancer Mortality in the United States, in BANBURY REPORT 9, supra note 9, at 4.
60. For many diseases there is currently no way to single out one cause and link it with an
effect. While some substances, such as DES, have been linked with a particular symptom or set
of symptoms shown not to be caused by other exposures, many diseases are not so easily categorized. Often the only possible linkages will be demonstrations of increased statistical incidences
in exposed human populations, but these may not show up for low levels of exposures.
61. See J. HIGHLAND, M. FINE & R. BOYLE, MALIGNANT NEGLECT 48 (1979).
62. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910, 2000 app. B; P. BARTH & H. HUNT, supra note 23, at 62-70; S.
EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 58 passim; Davis, Bridbord & Schneiderman, supra note 11, at 293-94;
Muir, Limitations and Advantages of Epidemiological Investigations in Environmental Carcinogenesis, in PUBLIC CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 15, at 153,
159-60; Selikoff, supra note 59, at 3, 5.
63. Renschler, Introductory Remarks, in TOXICOLOGY AS A PREDICTIVE SCIENCE, supra
note 55, at 221.
·
64. The costs of study vary with the methodology and the chemical. Thus, while the National Research Council cited the figure "up to a million dollars" as the cost for laboratory study
of a single chemical, it also recommended establishing priorities on "which chemicals to test and
which tests to perform." TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 14, 199-295. Several studies have
estimated costs on a more refined basis, with more specific estimates tied to types of testing. Cost
estimates vary depending on the type of testing. "Biodegradation tests, for example, cost in the
neighborhood of $5,000 to $12,000 to perform, while subchronic health tests may cost $100,000
or more and chronic toxicity and oncogenicity studies may cost $300,000 to $700,000." TSCA:
OVERVIEW AND EVALUATION, supra note 26, at 121. See also Portney, Toxic Substance Policy
and the Protection ofHuman Health, in CURRENT ISSUES JN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 136
(1978) (estimating that the standard laboratory tests necessary to determine the toxicity of a
single chemical cost from $200,000 to $750,000). The cost of epidemiology is harder to estimate
because of the variety of study designs. Cf COSTS STUDY, supra note 24, at app. E-1.
65. The rising cost of bioassays is due in part to inflation and in part to the fact that a wide
spectrum of toxic insults and effects is now the subject of each bioassay. Also, quality assurance
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ments in research that produces uncertain health data, instead of new
products. 66
Of course, the price of toxicological knowledge cannot be understood as a simple function of the expense of conducting individual
studies. Toxicological research as a social enterprise has produced a
substantial amount of health information in a relatively short span of
time, and as the field matures, it is developing new methodologies. A
developed and accessible database on chemical characteristics is itself
a powerful research tool. 67 Also, as toxicology identifies sources of
disease, it fills out the cost-benefit equation: it identifies the externalities of chemical toxicity. In addition, it may allow for continued use
of a chemical by making possible preventive medicine and by reducing
the cost to society of using the chemical. 68 Unfortunately, these benefits may not be recovered by individual firms, or their impact may not
be easily identifiable as the results of one company's research. Thus,
firms are unlikely to undertake costly testing, because the benefits are
public and cumulative and not reflected in the corporate balance sheet.
Toxicological data collection is beyond the reach of the individual and
is a problematic investment for firms.
Another important influence on data production is the simple fact
that toxicity and exposure are negative features of chemical products.
As long as no way exists for buyers to identify the toxic effects of
specific chemicals, there is no commercial incentive for chemical producers to identify and publicize them. 69 -Sellers will not willingly reveal negative characteristics of their products. 7° Comprehensive and
accessible toxicity rating systems would support affirmative advertismethods have been instituted. In 1980, the primary concern was to determine the target organs
of toxicity and whether or not the chemical was a carcinogen. Thus the price range for bioassays
in 1980 was $150,000 to $1.1 million; today, it is $470,000 to $2.9 million. McConnell Letter,
supra note 35.
,
66. Whether or not firms can afford to conduct bioassays is a separate question. In 1978
Samuel Epstein estimated that annual costs for testing the 700 chemicals that reach commerce
annually, at $200,000 each, would be .2% of the 1975 gross sales of the chemical industry, or
$140 million of its $5.5 billion after-tax profits. S. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 72-73.
67. See infra Part IV.
68. See Hodgson, Social and Economic Implications of Cancer in the !fnited States, in MANAGEMENT OF AsSESSED RISK, supra note 5, at 189 {discussing the economic costs of cancer).
69. TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 124 ("There is little incentive for voluntary reporting of either production or exposure data in the open literature or in accessible agency files, and
the few data available are often reported in forms that limit their comparability.'!).
70. Latin points out that producers are not always in the best position to know the effects of
their products, even though they know the products' components. See Latin, Environmental
Uncertainty, supra note 4, at 218. However, there are also strong commercial influences in favor
of data manipulation. Where firms have market power, they may have incentives to exploit or
even create uncertainty or imperfect information. See Beales, Craswell & Salop, The Efficient
Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J. L. & EcoN. 491, 507-09 (1981); Nelson, Information
and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. PoL. EcoN. 311 (1970); Rothschild, Models of Market Organiza-
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ing, but without a developed information context, there is no incentive
to study a chemical: the long-term health effects remain invisible for
one's own products and for those of one's competitors.
A series of market dysfunctions arises from these factors. 71 The
invisibility of chemical toxicity has destructive effects on the market
for chemicals. If product quality cannot be gauged by consumers, the
overall quality of products in the market will be affected. Buyers' inability to screen products removes any incentive for manufacturers to
differentiate between toxic and nontoxic products and to screen before
production. The result is a higher overall level of toxicity in products
than would result if toxicity were a visible characteristic. Chemical
products with lower toxicity will be penalized by the presence in the
market of some unknown number of toxics.
Indeed, as long as the information market remains undeveloped,
ignorance of toxicity may be an advantage to a product. New or unstudied chemicals will do better in relation to chemicals that have been
shown to have some indication of toxicity. Ignorance will tend to
prevail. 72
tion with Imperfect Information: A Survey, 81 J. PoL. EcoN. 1283, 1289-301 (1973); Salop, Information and Monopolistic Competition, 66 AM. EcoN. REV. 240 (1976).
71. In his paper, The Economics ofInformation, 69 J. PoL. ECON. 213 (1961), George Stigler
proposed to factor into economic analysis the costs of a search for information. He pointed out,
for instance, that price dispersion is a measure of ignorance about prices. Id. at 214. Stigler's
proposed model of how a search proceeds has been criticized. See Rothschild, supra note 70, at
1286-89. But search costs are now a standard notion in economic analysis:
Whenever market participants lack information, there is a potential for reduced efficiency
and distributional damage (however defined). If workers are unaware of more advantageous
employment possibilities, labor markets will not allocate labor efficiently. If investors are
unaware of potentially profitable investments, capital markets will not allocate capital efficiently. If consumers are unaware of better purchase opportunities or the characteristics of
the goods they purchase, markets will not guide production efficiently. When public goods
and externalities distort the informational content of relative prices, aggregated decisions
will not allocate resources efficiently. All of the above distortions and deviations created by
insufficient information also create a pattern of income gains and losses for different participants relative to perfectly functioning markets.
R. BARTLETI & u. APTE, supra note 8, at 22.
72. This dynamic is illustrated by economist George Akerlof's simplified model of the used
car market. When cars are new, neither the seller nor the buyer will know if a given car is a
lemon. Therefore, there is a risk of getting a lemon, yet the buyer will pay the same price because
she cannot tell the difference. The problem intensifies, however, in the used car market. Good
cars are less likely to be traded or sold, leaving lemons to make up a relatively larger share of the
used car market. This will deflate the price of used cars generally and force good cars off the
market because sellers cannot get full value, making it a market for lemons. The effect is analogous in a field of chemical products, though the parallel is inexact. There is no advantage to
manufacturers in producing chemical products with demonstrated nontoxicity and incurring the
expense of testing, because products cannot be told apart on this basis anyway, given the invisibility of toxicity. See Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons'~· Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. EcoN. 488 (1970) (discussing implications of buyers' limited ability to judge
the quality of products of varying grades); Wilson, The Nature of Equilibrium in Markets with
Adverse Selection, 11 BELL J. EcoN. 108 (1980). The basic incentive to maintain a level of ignorance about toxicity may be enhanced where the producing sector is concentrated, as it is in parts
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While normal market responses to the dysfunctions described here
include advertising, pooling of buyer resources, and development of
third-party information providers and product rating services, 73 none
of these can develop without accessible chemical identity data. A fundamental information asymmetry in the chemicals market is created
by the fact that the chemical producer knows what the chemical is,'
while the buyer often does not. Without the chemical identity of the
product, the buyer cannot seek assistance in developing information
independently. 74 Chemical manufacturers can be thought of as free
riders in this context, "riding" on consumer ignorance: they benefit by
not providing toxicity data, at the expense of consumer uncertainty
and injury. Absent regulation, the information is likely to remain undisclosed and unexamined, since the interests of its holders are adverse
to those of the beneficiaries of disclosure.
Furthermore, when toxicity data is produced privately, for example in response to regulation, market incentives may detract from its
quality. Producers tie information production to the product's budget.
The result may be a cheaper grade, lower quality product and a cheap
grade of information. 75 Thus, while valuable information has been
produceq by industry sources, particularly under statutory schemes
which require ex ante registration of chemical products, its volume
and its quality have been affected by the constraints of the commercial
of the synthetic chemicals industry. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F.
Supp. 740, 828 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
73. Stigler notes that advertising and the development of specialized traders are obvious responses to high search costs. Stigler, supra note 71, at 216-17. Akerlof notes that guarantees,
brand name goods, and licenses are responses to situations in which product quality 'is obscure to
the consumer. Akerlof, supra note 72, at 499-500. Salop suggests that advertising, which is
costly for the firm, may also complicate the consumer's search. Salop, supra note 70, at 244.
74. Normally, purchasers may bargain for data. However, in the chemicals context, the
data's invisibility and complexity and the lack of accessible assistance in' managing it have discouraged this approach. Beales, Craswell & Salop point out that "consumers may underestimate
the value of additional information simply because they lack other data that would tell them of
their need to learn more." Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 70, at 491, 506. Market-based
obstacles to workers' access and use of data about occupational disease are also discussed by
Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1237-44. They note that the existing general lack of information discourages individuals and unions from bargaining for occupational health information
and tangible preventive measures. See also O'Reilly, Driving a Soft Bargain: Unions, Toxic
Materials, and Right to Know Legislation, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 307 (1985) (discussing why
unions infrequently bargain with management for chemical data).
75. See Oi, The Economics of Product Safety, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3, 5-19 (1973).
Oi assumes that producers are liable for the injuries of consumers, but they have no mechanism
to lessen the damage costs of individual consumers; consumers are assumed to have perfect information about product risks, to know their expected damage costs, and to be able to obtain inexpensive, actuarially fair insurance. On these assumptions, producer liability leads to an
inefficient outcome because producers essentially must bear the costs of the product and an insurance policy for heterogeneous consumers. Strict consumer liability allows the consumer to
purchase separately the optimal quality of product and the optimal insurance policy. The
model's assumptions identify the elements of the information problem.
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context. 76
Even when privately produced information is of high quality, the
commercial context diminishes its credibility and, thus, its value.77 Information that is complex and easily manipulable will be particularly
undervalued, unless it can be independently corroborated. Indeed, deception certainly occurs and is often perceived as widespread. These
factors limit the usefulness of toxicity data generated by private chemical producers. 1s
The market disincentives to production and obstacles to independent evaluation of private data make public intervention necessary to
ensure that accurate data are produced and distributed optimally. In76. See Shapiro, Divorcing Profit Motivation from New Drug Research: A Consolidation of
Proposals to Provide the FDA with Reliable Test Data, 1978 DUKE L.J. 155, 161-68 (citing evi-

dence that drug manufacturers' safety research is influenced by the profit motive and that con·
tractual commercial relationships between researchers and drug sponsors are themselves a strong
influence on the quality of data).
77. Viscusi suggests that, because the value of information often cannot be known before it is
purchased, information that is cheap or free in a competitive marketplace will be viewed by
recipients as having little value .. Indeed, he maintains that much information that is now pro·
vided to workers is not intended to enable them to assess risks more accurately, but to lower their
assessment of their risks. "The most widespread claim by firms is that National Safety Council
statistics indicate that the worker is safer at work than at home - a statement that • • • is
intentionally misleading." W. V1scus1, RISK BY CHOICE 71-75 (1983). Information provided
cheaply to workers must be relatively favorable, since otherwise the firm will be forced to pay
higher wages.
A. SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALLING: INFORMATION TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED
SCREENING (Harvard Econ. Stud., vol. 143) (1974) describes the process of communication in
transactions as signalling and examines the inefficiencies that occur when firms invest in making
a product appear to have characteristics that it lacks. See infra note 150.
78. Epstein, Constraints in Decisionmaking, in PUBLIC CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL
HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 15, at 309-17, and Peto, Distorting the Epidemiology of Cancer:
The Need for a More Balanced Overview, 284 NATURE 297 (Mar. 27, 1980), agree on the prevalence of manipulated toxicity data. Richard Peto writes that "[s]o many examples of financially
motivated bias exist that the motives and work of industrial scientists and consultants are inevita·
bly distrusted." Peto, supra, at 297. Epstein cites cases of poor-quality data and data manipulation which not only increase the costs of regulation, but also cause considerable loss of private
investment. He suggests that both conscious and unconscious motivations to produce positive
data are inherent in the market situation:
Escalating evidence has shown that constraints of data, ranging from gross inadequacy,
biased interpretation, manipulation, suppression, and even to outright destruction, are com·
monplace, especially when profitable technologies, both products and processes, are in·
volved. Alarmingly, such evidence now justifies a priori reservations regarding the validity
of any data developed by institutions or individuals whose economic interests are directly or
indirectly affected.
Epstein, supra, at 309.
Portney discusses the problem of firms' incentives to choose testing procedures most likely to
shed favorable light on the substances they wish to market. In some cases, incentives are strong
enough to cause firms to falsify or withhold test data. Portney suggests three means by which to
combat these incentives. First, well-defined testing procedures should be established and applied
by all agencies regulating toxic substances. Second, federal agencies shoulCI expedite verification
of controversial data. Third, stiff penalties should be levied for violating protocols or falsifying
results. Portney, supra note 4, at 138.
Deception has also been an issue in toxics litigation. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 828 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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terventions, however, must be designed to fit the needs of the situation
and to minimize unintended secondary effects. Legal strategies in the
toxics area have generally not met these conditions.

III.

THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL REGULATORY STRATEGIES

Regulatory schemes that have attempted to correct these market
dysfunctions have not succeeded. Neither the liability system nor regulation has effectively located responsibility for the toxic side effects of
chemicals. Indeed, the law not only fails to encourage the production
and distribution of toxicity data, it has tended to discourage it.
Liability rules increase the costs of private production of such
knowledge. The tort system is predicated upon the existence of information linking cause with effect, but the manufacturer often is the
only party in a financial position to perform the research necessary to
prove a causal connection. Potential liability is therefore another influence that discourages manufacturers from producing this information. Compensation schemes are similarly dependent on existing data
to prove causation. 79
Products liability rules have stimulated safety research where the
reasons for plaintiffs' injuries are apparent or can be determined with
relatively inexpensive expert assistance. The same dynamics could develop with respect to chemicals, if the means of producing toxicity
data were accessible to parties other than manufacturers, particularly
to those who are exposed or their representatives. If there were independent sources of data, the potential costs to a manufacturer of not
producing its own information might be high. Producing data and
warning of negative effects would become a form of protection against
the costs of liability. The existence of independent sources of data
would also encourage higher quality in manufacturers' tests, because a
third party would be able to check results. The liability system's deterrent effect thus depends upon a developed information context, with
independent researchers.
Although courts are generally in no position to mandate major research initiatives and must await independent documentation of causal
links, the need for testing has drawn some judicial attention. In
Beshada v. Johns Manville Products Corp., so the Supreme Court of
New Jersey faced the fact that manufacturers control the production
of data on toxicity. Using "cheapest cost avoider" reasoning, the
79. Viscusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim Compensation and
Risk Regulation, 2 YALE J. REG. 53, 62-75 (1984); Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 124456.
80. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
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court found that manufacturers' ability to conduct safety research precluded a state-of-the-art defense to a strict products liability claim for
injury from asbestos exposure. 81 Later, the court retreated somewhat
from this position, and its present stance is unclear. 82 However,
awareness of producers' advantages in obtaining information is a persistent theme in toxic tort decisions. For instance, in Borel v.
Fibreboq.rd Paper Products Corp., 83 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit recognized a chemical manufacturer's duty to test in conjunction with the duty to warn, but did not elaborate on the extent of
testing required. 84 This duty to test was apparently drawn from the
line of cases dealing with a manufacturer's duty to test and label dangerous drugs, a rule with early statutory roots. The idea of prospective testing was also present in the "Agent Orange" litigation, in which
Judge Weinstein approved a settlement agreement, in part on the
ground that the federal government planned to conduct research on
the health effects of "Agent Orange."85
Statutory solutions, which rely on controlled screening by administrative agencies, have also been attempted. 86 But the regulatory strategies of the past two decades have been only partial improvements over
the liability system. Agencies acquire and develop data in the course
of regulating specific chemicals, although the process is influenced by
the same market factors that handicap the liability system. Agencies
also can issue reporting requirements and invest directly in research.
81. 90 N.J. at 206-07, 447 A.2d at 548 (relying in part on Calabresi & Hirshoff, Toward a
Test of Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972)). This position is supported by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which has held that barring the state-of-the-art
defense in asbestos cases, but not in others, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. In re
Asbestos Litig., 829 F.2d 1233 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1586 (1988).
82. The limit on Beshada was articulated in a separate context, a case involving an injury
related to a prescription drug. Without discussion, the court seemed to confine the Beshada .rule
to the asbestos context. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
83. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
84. 493 F.2d at 1089 (stating only that tests "must be commensurate with the dangers
involved").
85. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 851-57 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
However, government-sponsored studies have been hampered by lack of data. Lack of Military
Data Halts Agent Orange Study, N.Y. Times, Sept. l, 1987, at Al, col. 3.
86. This "purchasing agent" model of consumer protection has been criticized on the
grounds that it imposes costs on consumers who may prefer to use cheaper, more dangerous
products. Reich, Toward a New Consumer Protection, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 25 (1979). However, government intervention in a market is appropriate when there are hidden costs, nonrepeat
sales, and low levels of competition; the first of these is certainly present in the chemicals market.
Reich recommends that interventions avoid taking control over product quality or seller conduct; rather, they should overcome information weaknesses and facilitate independent information brokers, which may need to be subsidized by government. See id., at 26, 31-39. But see
Latin, Environmental Uncertainty, supra note 4, at 222-33.
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The last approach generally has been more successful in generating
useful data than have regulatory proceedings.
There are two basic methods for setting standards for human exposure to chemicals, normally accomplished by reviewing the health effects of one chemical at a time. 87 The first approach is ex ante
regulation, which is used to control the effects of food additives, drugs,
and pesticides. Substances so classified must be proved safe prior to
marketing through a registration process in which the product's proponent has the burden of proof. In contrast, most environmental and
occupational controls, like tort liability, are applied ex post -i.e., only
when research establishes both significant exposure to and toxicity of a
chemical. 88 In both approaches, the agency makes a determination of
an acceptable level of human exposure, based upon the available information on toxicity.
In ex ante regulation, while the agency must either produce parallel data or carefully check the toxicity data generated by a product's
proponent, 89 the product's proponent must generate some information
in order to get the product to the market. Product registration has
yielded stronger informational support for regulators than has the ex
post approach. 90 The results of the National Research Council's survey in Toxicity Testing confirm that ex ante regulation is superior from
the point of view of producing relevant health information. 91
In ex post regulation the agency, usually the EPA and OSHA,
must collect the initial toxicity and exposure information. Since environmental and occupational regulations impose costs which had been
successfully externalized, the pressures of the market are arrayed
87. Regulation by groups of chemicals is less common. RCRA authorizes EPA to regulate
"waste" as such, rather than each element of a waste stream. 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1982). Congress
has occasionally directed EPA to regulate a list of pollutants. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7422 (1982); see
also Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (1982). In the late 1970s, several
agencies adopted "carcinogen policies" designed to settle basic scientific questions concerning the
causes of cancer and to simplify the approach to regulation of suspected carcinogens. See, e.g.,
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Policy and Procedure for Identifying, Assessing, and Regulating Airborne Substances Posing a Risk of Cancer, 44 Fed. Reg.
58,642 (1979). This approach was set aside by the Reagan administration.
88. Richard Stewart suggests that firms today generally have the burden of demonstrating
acceptable social performance before operation or marketing; ex post regulation consists of policing, recalls, and registration cancellation based on new information. See Stewart, Regulation,
Innovation, and Administrative Law, supra note 4, at 1269 & n.36. This framework assumes that
agencies have complete information on the risks in their jurisdiction and adequate resources to
fully regulate based on such information.
·
89. See Shapiro, supra note 76, at 181-83.
90. See TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10.
91. See id., and CHEMICALS AND HEALTH, supra note 9, at 93-94, both of which recommend
continuing to place responsibility for testing on industry before allowing the marketing of drugs
or food additives.
·
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against ex post limits on chemical use and exposure. The regulated
industry's incentive to produce data is limited to minimizing the costs
of regulation, once regulation appears to be a likely outcome. Businesses can avoid or mitigate the costs of regulation by minimizing the
amount or credibility of any existing information which indicates toxicity. Regulated firms have strong incentives to produce studies aimed
at increasing uncertainty about any suspected toxic effects of chemicals under review. Regulatory proceedings may continue for some
time in a tug-of-war over the validity of toxicity data. 92 A bottleneck
develops as agency resources are absorbed in accumulating masses of
data on the same limited problem and attention is channeled into a
narrow, even obsessive focus.
While standard-setting proceedings generate less useful information than might be desired, there are other ways for agencies to obtain
it. Since World War II, the government has built an extensive infrastructure that supports and advances public environmental and health
research.
Today the National Toxicology Program (NTP) coordinates toxicology and related research programs conducted by the National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences, the FDA's National Center
for Toxicological Research, and the Centers for Disease Control's National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. The National
Cancer Institute and other branches of the National Institutes of
Health also perform or oversee research related to toxicology. The
NTP publishes an annual list of all funded research projects to help
92. The commentators often note failed or congested rulemaking processes in this context.
E.g., Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1256-64; see also McGarity, Substantive and Proce·
dural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Cardno·
gens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 730-31 (1979); Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and
Administrative Law, supra note 4, at 1269, 1283-84.
An example of this phenomenon is the EPA's implementation of the National Emissions
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, mandated by § 112 of the Clean Air Act. After
designating five pollutants as hazardous in the early 1970s and completing the required rulemak·
ing within the statutory time limits, the EPA litigated the vinyl chloride designation with the
plastics industry. Since then, the EPA has designated few chemicals as hazardous, even though
many pollutants in the ambient air pose serious health risks. The format of the rulemaking
proceeding and of judicial review makes it worthwhile for regulated businesses to litigate every
aspect of an agency decision, as litigation will generally be cheaper than installing technological
controls to reduce pollution. As a result, § 112 has consumed considerable agency resources and
produced little health protection.
Even where Congress has directed the EPA to issue rules controlling toxics within specific
time periods, the process has bogged down. The history of 42 U.S.C. § 7422 (1982) is educative.
See, e.g., New York v. Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.160-.186
(1988). See generally Shapiro, Scientific Issues and the Function ofHearing Procedures: Evaluat·
ing the FDA's Public Board of Inquiry, 1986 DUKE L.J. 288, 304-07 (discussing whether adver·
sary proceedings are appropriate for scientific issues); Pederson, Formal Records and Informal
Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38 (1975).
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funding agencies avoid duplication in giving grants for research. 93
However, the National Research Council has noted problems with
existing patterns of toxicological research and testing, including inadequate coverage and duplication. The Council recommended numerous changes in priority-setting and coordination of the research
process, building upon existing procedures and methodologies. 94
Congress has begun to experiment with private funding for public
toxicological research. The Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) expanded the authority of the Agency for
Toxic Substances Disease Registry (ATSDR) and directed the EPA to
promulgate regulations to require, where appropriate, payment by
chemical manufacturers and processors of the costs of the ATSDR's
research on 100 priority toxics found at hazardous waste sites. 95 However, the EPA does not perceive this provision to be a mandate to
establish a significant research program. 96
A more substantial proposal for private funding of agency research
was included in recent amendments to the federal pesticide regulatory
scheme. The impetus for this amendment was the finding that, at current funding levels, the EPA would take forty years to complete testing of products now on the market. The 1988 Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) amendments give the EPA
the authority to set fees for the use of active pesticide ingredients and
for registering pesticide products. The system is expected to generate
$150 million for EPA pesticide administration and research, though
93. See NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM: REVIEW, supra note 29, at 173; CHEMICALS
AND HEALTH, supra note 9, at 88.
94. See TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10.
95. The ATSDR was established under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), within the Public Health Service. CERCLA
directed the ATSDR to develop an inventory of literature on the health effects of toxic substances and to "conduct periodic survey and screening programs to determine relationships between exposure to toxic substances and illness." CERCLA § 104(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (1982).
The agency finally began operation under a 1983 consent decree following litigation over the
Reagan administration's failure to implement the ATSDR. Environmental Defense Fund v.
Heckler, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,630 (D.D.C. 1983).
In 1986, Congress significantly expanded the authority and responsibilities of ATSDR. Today, the ATSDR and the EPA must prepare and periodically expand a list of at least 100 substances that pose a health threat to humans because of their presence at designated Superfund
waste sites. The ATSDR must collect existing health data on these substances and, where inadequate, must perform additional study. The EPA is directed to promulgate regulations to provide, where appropriate, for payment of the costs of research by manufacturers and processors
identified through the TSCA and FIFRA registration process. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(2)-(5) (Supp.
IV 1986).
96. The proposed revised National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan discusses treating documentation costs as clean-up costs, under certain circumstances, but it
does not expand on SARA's direction to establish private funding for new health effects research.
See 53 Fed. Reg. 51,394, 51,402 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.160(d)) (proposed Dec.
21, 1988).
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the latter will be literature searches, rather than production of new
data. 97
The limited budget for publicly supported research is supplemented by administrative reporting requirements. The 1976 Toxic
S'!lbstances Control Act (TSCA)98 is the major federal vehicle for collecting and managing existing private data. 99 The TSCA also gives the
EPA limited authority to require manufacturers to conduct new tests
of their products. 100 When enacted in 1976, the TSCA represented an
important regulatory innovation. The EPA, in testimony before a
House Subcommittee, declared:
[T]he Nation's population and environment provide testing grounds for
determining the effects a toxic substance has on human or environmental
health. The authority contemplated by the Toxic Substances Control
Act would establish requirements for testing substances believed to pose
an unreasonable risk before they are dispersed by various means
throughout the environment and are difficult, if not impossible, to
controI. 101

However, the TSCA has not fulfilled its early promise. 102 It has pro97. In September 1988, Congress reauthorized FIFRA. The new law requires the EPA to
assess, within nine years, the health and environmental effects of about 600 active pesticide ingre·
dients, many of which were approved based on testing procedures that are now outdated. The
process, called reregistration, was required by the 1978 amendments to FIFRA, but at the current funding and pace of testing the agency could not complete the task before the year 2024. To
help speed the process, the 1988 FIFRA amendments will require all manufacturers of each
active pesticide ingredient to share a fee of up to $150,000 and each product registrant to pay a
fee of up to $425 for each year of the reregistration program. FIFRA Reauthorization Passes
Senate, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 626 (Oct. 12, 1988).
98. 15 u.s.c. § 2601 (1982).
99. Numerous other statutes require agencies to collect data and report to Congress. For
example, the 1978 amendments to the National Cancer Act require the Department of Health
and Human Services to prepare an annual report on all widely exposed chemicals that "may
reasonably be anticipated to be carcinogens," including exposure data, an indication of whether
the substance has been regulated, and an assessment of regulatory efficiency in reducing expo·
sure. 42 U.S.C. § 24l(b)(4) (1982). Moreover, a number of federal laws give agencies broad
authority to request and subpoena data from regulated firms. See, e.g.. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401, 7607 (1982). Some also require routine reporting of discharges of specified pollutants.
See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1318 (1982).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (1982). For an early history of the TSCA, see R. DRULEY & G.
ORDWAY, THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (1981).
101. Toxic Substances Control Act: Hearings on R.R. 7229, H.R. 7548, and R.R. 7664 Before
the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 94th Cong., lst Sess. 213 (1975) (statement of John R. Quarles, Jr., Deputy Adminis·
trator, EPA).
102. In H.R. REP. No. 968, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980), the House Committee on Inter·
state and Foreign Commerce noted that the EPA had failed to meet a number of statutory and
internal deadline provisions. See also Recent Developments, Hazardous Substances - Environ·
mental Protection Agency's Final Notification Rule Under the Toxic Substances Control Act, Sec·
tion 12(b). 16 TEXAS INTL. L.J. 546, 548 (1981).
TSCA's enactment was accompanied by the expectation that there would be a dramatic in·
crease in the testing of chemicals. Companies such as Monsanto and Allied Chemicals increased
their laboratory capacity and a number of companies joined to support the Chemical Industry
Institute in conducting tests. The expected demand for testing never developed, however, and by
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duced an inventory of chemicals in use, but has not generated or distributed significant amounts of exposure or toxicity data. 103 Even the
inventory generated by the TSCA is incomplete, and large parts of it
are unavailable for use outside the EP A's Office of Toxic
Substances. 104
The TSCA directs the EPA to screen toxics entering the market.
The EPA keeps an inventory of all chemical substances used, manufactured, or imported in the United States. Manufacturers and importers of new chemicals must notify the EPA and submit
information, in the form of Premanufacture Notice~ (PMNs), concerning each new chemical's structure, its intended uses, expected quantities of production, estimates of potential human exposure, and any
health effects data that the manufacturer may have: no new testing is
required. Based on the PMN information, the EPA is to screen each
chemical to determine whether it presents an unreasonable health
risk. 105 Most PMNs, however, do not contain much useful data. A
1983 study by the Office of Technology Assessment found that only
fifty-three percent of the notices contained any health or safety data at
all. Data that were supplied dealt primarily with acute, relatively apparent effects. Only about twenty percent contained data releval).t to
1984 Dr. James Liverman, ofLitton-Bionetics, estimated that private testing.labs were operating
at less than 60% of capacity. See w. DRAYTON, AMERICA'S Toxic PROTECTION GAP 76
(1984).
103. Under TSCA, the EPA has established the basic inventory of existing chemicals and a
number of related data systems. These systems rely primarily on the data that manufacturers
submit to the EPA in their premanufacture notices, but are also supplemented by the EPA staff.
Interagency coordination of data management has also been a focus of TSCA implementation.
See LAYMAN'S GUIDE, supra note 10, at 6-9. Many of these new substances are bioengineered
products.
·
104. The Bureau of Labor Statistics refuses to give any of its firm-specific data to OSHA or
any other group. W. V1scus1, supra note.77, at 84-85.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (1982). The EPA usually compares the physiochemical properties of
each chemical to others that have known effects as a coarse screen for selecting suspect chemicals
for further testing. On this limited basis, the agency decides whether to require the manufactur_er
to conduct tests or to limit production. A chemical structure that is similar to a proven health
hazard provides some basis for concern about its possible effects, but similarity is not determinative, as in the example of benzene and toluene. See supra text accompanying note 30. Critics of
this approach point out that screening by analogy, as opposed to relying on direct test data,-may
be a convenient proxy, but can be greatly deficient; for instance, this method would almost certainly have failed to identify PCBs as a risk, since they have low acute toxicity and are inert. See
W. DRAYTON, supra note 102, at 72.
TSCA also authorizes the EPA to monitor changes in production levels and uses of chemicals. The EPA may determine by a rule that certain uses of chemical substances are "significant
new uses." 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(2) (1982). Persons subject to a Significant New Use Rule
(SNUR) must report. TSCA 1986 REPORT, supra note 10, at 13-15. Section 8 ofTSCA directs
the EPA to promulgate rules to require record-keeping and reporting. Manufacturers and certain processors must maintain records of "significant adverse reactions." 15 U.S.C. § 2607(c)
(1982). The EPA required submission of such records for the first time in 1986.
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such long-term effects as cancer. 106
The EPA's authority under the TSCA to require development of
new information is limited. 107 To require further tests or to limit production, the EPA must conduct a rulemaking procedure, which must
begin within ninety days of the PMN filing. The EPA may order testing only if it demonstrates that the chemical may pose an unreasonable risk to human health. 108 This involved process discourages
agency action. The EPA has issued few orders requiring production
of data beyond the initial submissions of manufacturers. 109 Instead, it
has tended to engage in lengthy analyses of a few chemicals in order to
support its findings of unreasonable risk. 1 1°
TSCA's requirement that the EPA issue a rule before requiring
testing distinguishes it from food, drug, and pesticide regulations,
which mandate production of safety data prior to marketing. The
TSCA standard essentially establishes a presumption of safety, 111
which the agency must overcome before it may require further testing
of a chemical. Thus, the TSCA's use of strict rulemaking standards
inhibits the very information production the statute was written to
encourage.
106. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF PRE·
MANUFACTURE NOTICES 50-51 (1983).
107. The institutional capacity for implementing TSCA has developed slowly and is still inadequate. TSCA's basic inventory is being updated now for the first time. TSCA 1986 REPORT,
supra note 10, at 4.
108. The Administrator may issue a rule requiring further testing by the manufacturer if he
finds that the chemical "may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environ·
ment" or that there "may be significant or substantial human exposure to [it]" and where there
are insufficient data to determine reasonably its effects. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (1982). If the Ad·
ministrator finds that the chemical "will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment," he may issue a rule regulating its production or distribution. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)
(1982).
Section 2603(e) ofTSCA establishes the Interagency Testing Committee (ITC), which is directed to select and recommend to the EPA a list of no more than 50 chemicals each year whose
risks warrant priority consideration. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(e)(l)(A) (1982). The EPA must then
either initiate rulemaking to require testing by the manufacturer or publish its reasons for not
doing so. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(e)(l)(B) (1982).
109. As of 1983, the EPA had required testing on 4% of new chemicals. An additional 2%
were voluntarily tested, and 1% were made subject to use controls. See W. DRAYTON, supra
note 102, at 69. As of 1984, the EPA had issued no final rules requiring testing processes and
had obtained 84 voluntary agreements to test. Id. at 72. In 1986, the EPA issued orders controlling exposure to 67 new chemicals, pending development of new data, pursuant to section 5(e) of
TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e) (1982). Forty-five other chemicals were withdrawn after the EPA
announced it would take 5(e) or S(f) actions. This represents action on 112 out of the year's
1693 PMNs. TSCA 1986 REPORT, supra note 10, at 9. Of the existing backlog of thousands,
only 76 chemicals were reviewed. Of those, six were referred for information-gathering rules and
51 are being evaluated further. Id.
110. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency,
595 F. Supp. 1255, 1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
111. Harlow, The EPA and Biotechnology Regulation: Coping with Scientific Uncertainty, 95
YALE L.J. 553, 567 (1986).
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While the ambition of TSCA to collect and produce useful data on
chemicals has been only partially realized, the statute does recognize
the central role of a comprehensive database for chemicals regulation.
It also acknowledges, though only in a limited way, the validity of
public authority to order private toxicity testing. This precept has
now been expanded by the SARA and FIFRA provisions for private
funding of public data management. The TSCA approach represents a
transition, which is being followed by more sophisticated uses of data,
including broad data dissemination.
IV.

DISTRIBUTING DATA IN THE MARKET

Traditional regulatory approaches have neglected to distribute the
information they do collect. The information access provisions in
most environmental statutes have been, at best, unambitious reformulations of the Freedom of Information Act. 112 They have simply provided for access to agency files, with exemption from disclosure for
certain categories of information, such as trade secrets, and they have
encouraged none of the potential uses of information to warn or guide
private decisionmaking. Indeed, past laws have sometimes seemed to
encourage behavior that has the characteristics of information
hoarding.
Right-to-know laws change existing information dynamics, making chemicals visible in a new way, by providing new information to
actors in the marketplace. The laws direct disclosure of both the identity of chemicals and information about chemicals' effects. Disclosure
is currently limited to chemicals already known to have toxic
potential.
These disclosure requirements appear in both state and federal occupational health and environmental regulations. Many states enacted
right-to-know laws in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 113 State laws
covering workers are now partially preempted by OSHA's Hazard
112. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982) (FOIA) with 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c) (1982) (Clean Air
Act).
113. See supra note 2. The first state laws were in New York and California. See N.Y.
PUBLIC HEALTH LAWS §§ 4800-4808 (McKinney 1985); N.Y. LABOR LAW§§ 875-883 (McKinney 1985); CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 6360-6399 (West Supp. 1988). California has supplemented its original right-to-know statute with the more expansive Proposition 65. Cal. Admin.
Notice Reg. 87, No. 11-Z (Mar. 13, 1987) (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 25180.7, 25249.5-.13 (West Supp. 1988)). The proliferation of other state regulations is well
reported. See generally BNA SPECIAL REPORT, RIGHT-TO-KNOW: A REGULATORY UPDATE
ON PROVIDING CHEMICAL HAZARD INFORMATION (1985) [hereinafter RIGHT-TO-KNOW: A
REGULATORY UPDATE] (twenty-five states had enacted worker right-to-know provisions as of
1985).
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Communication Standard. 114 After the disastrous leak of methyl isocyanate at the Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, and
several chemical accidents in the United States in 1985, 115 Congress
enacted the federal Emergency Planning and Community Right-toKnow Act (EPCRA), Title III of the Superfund Amendment and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). 116 The EPCRA does not preempt state laws. 117 Consequently, the OSHA Hazard Communication
Standard, Title III of SARA, and those state laws that relate to disclosure outside the workplace together establish a broad program of data
distribution.
OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard contains a set of rules
which have emerged as the basic framework of the overall information
system. Originally written to apply only to the manufacturing sector,
covering about 14 million workers in 300,000 establishments, OSHA
was ordered in 1987 to expand its rules to cover all employees.us The
OSHA rules require employers to identify and to warn workers only of
known chemical hazards. 119 There is no requirement that employers
114. See, e.g., New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587 {3d Cir.
1985) (New Jersey Right-to-Know Act expressly preempted by the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard only insofar as the New Jersey Act pertains to the health and safety of manufacturing employees); Manufacturers Assn. v. Knepper, 801 F.2d 130 {3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 66 (1987) (Pennsylvania Worker and Community Right-to-Know Act was not preempted
outside the manufacturing sector; education and training requirement was preempted as to manufacturing employees, but hazard survey, labeling, and Material Data Safety Sheets Requirements were only partially preempted); Ohio Mfrs. Assn. v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824 (6th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 44 (1987) (the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard preempted the City's right-to-know ordinance, although Congress did not expressly preempt local
regulation of health and safety in the area of toxic and hazardous substances by provisions in
OSHA).
115. The most notable of these occurred in August 1985, when a cloud of toxic aldicarb
oxime gas leaked from a Union Carbide plant in Institute, West Virginia, sending 135 people to
the hospital for treatment. See Union Carbide: New Accidents Revive Safety Issues, 63 CHEM. &
ENG. NEWS 4 (1985); Reducing the Risk of Chemical Accidents: The Post-Bhopal Era, 16 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,300 (Oct. 1986); supra note 13 .
. . 116. 42 U.S.C. § 116 (Supp. IV 1986).
)17. 42 U.S.C. § 1104l(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
118. See United Steelworkers v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.S
(1988).
119. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200{b), (d)(2) (1988) (any health impact for which there is statistically significant evidence of effects from occupational exposure must be reported; "significant
evidence" exists when there is at least one positive study conducted in accordance with established scientific principles). OSHA's rules also establish standards for assessment of mixtures by
employer-US\!rs downstream from the manufacturer. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(d)(5) {1988). Ifan
employer uses a process that produces chemicals to which employees may be exposed, that employer becomes a "chemical manufacturer" within the meaning of the rules and is required to
evaluate the hazard of the chemical. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(c) (1988).
OSHA presumes chemicals to be hazardous if they are listed under Subpart Z of the OSHA
standards for hazardous and toxic substances, if they are listed as carcinogens by the National
Toxicology Program (NTP) or the International Agency for Research on Cancer {IARC), or if a
Threshold Limit Value (TLV) has been adopted for the chemical by the American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygienists. 29 C.F.R. § 1200(d), apps. A, B, and C (1988). A number
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perform new tests on chemicals' health effects. However, the results of
each existing study that indicates an adverse health effect must be
communicated, whether the employer agrees with the study or not. 120
The rules also specify labeling requirements for containers and conduits, require posting of warning notices in the workplace, and mandate chemical safety training, which is an essential element of any
information program from the worker's point of view. 121
The basic medium of information exchange has been the Material
Safety Data Sheet (MSDS). This form contains information about the
chemical substance, including its chemical identity, the name used on
the container label, its physical and chemical characteristics, health
hazards, primary routes of entry or exposure, the regulatory provisions applicable to it, safety precautions, emergency first aid procedures, the date of preparation of the MSDS, and the name, address,
and telephone number of the person responsible· for preparing it. 122
The information is comprehensive and to the point. Unfortunately,
OSHA requires no standard MSDS format and some states require
disclosure of more information than does OSHA. MSDS formats and
computerized information services are developing in incompatible
formats, limiting the potential for comparing and combining
of state Jaws have provided specifically for inclusion of additional lists of suspected hazardous
chemicals and a few have established procedures for defining hazardous chemicals which are not
currently on any list. For example, Pennsylvania provides for automatic updating of its hazardous substance list whenever any of its constituent lists is changed. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 7303(b) (Purdon Supp. 1988).
120. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(b), (d)(5) (1988).
121. Pursuant to OSHA's rules, employers are responsible for training workers who handle
hazardous chemicals at the time of their initial assignment and whenever a new hazard is introduced to the workplace; training includes informing workers about their rights under the hazard
communication rules. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(h) (1988). Employers must have a written plan
outlining their methods of communication with employees and listing all covered chemicals. 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1200(e) (1988).
122. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(g) (1988). OSHA and most states require that for each
chemical the manufacturer must prepare an MSDS. MSDSs have been in use for more than a
decade, but previously were not mandatory. Support for mandatory and automatic provision of
MSDSs by manufacturers and importers was very strong at the OSHA hearings and came from
many sectors of business that use but do not manufacture chemicals. See 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280,
53,305-07 (1983).
The Material Safety Data Sheets must be made available to all buyers and employees. Several
states provide for definite time periods for employer responses to an information request, while
OSHA requires an immediate response. Several provide that a worker need not work with a
substance for which the information has not been provided and several stipulate that a worker
may not be discriminated against because of an information request. For a digest of the federal
and state Jaws, see RIGHT-TO-KNOW: A REGULATORY UPDATE, supra note 113; HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS: RIGHT-TO-KNOW NEWS, Nov. 15, 1985, at 5-12.
OSHA and 17 states require labeling of hazardous chemical containers, and 23 states require
training of employees handling chemicals. See RIGHT-TO-KNOW: A REGULATORY UPDATE,
supra note 113.
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information. 123
Although the chemicals it covers are in part selected according to
different standards, the EPCRA's communication requirements build
upon OSHA's rules. The EPCRA is designed primarily to enable localities to prepare an emergency response to chemical accidents. Section 301 of the EPCRA mandates the formation of state and local
emergency response committees, which are responsible for local planning.124 Section 312 requires that every firm subject to OSHA's rules
complete an inventory of chemicals covered by those rules and provide
it to the local committee. The inventory must contain a description of
the amount and storage location of hazardous chemicals. 125 Industrial
facilities that use chemicals on the EPA's list of "extremely hazardous
substances" must notify the local committee of the presence of these
chemicals, immediately report any unexpected releases, and participate in the committee's planning activities. 126 The local committee
has discretion to determine whether all of the section 312 inventory
data are to be made available to the public. 127
The EPCRA also directs the EPA to begin compiling a national
database on routine toxic discharges into the environment. Section
313, the national toxics inventory provision, requires that firms locate
and quantify discharges into the environment of any of 329 specified
chemicals. 128 These must be reported annually to the EPA, which is
to use them to assess the nation's use of chemicals. The national toxics inventory will also provide the basis for more sophisticated regulatory planning, 129 and the inventory data must be made accessible to
123. See infra notes 172, 204 and accompanying text.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 11,001 (Supp. IV 1986).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 11,022 (Supp. IV 1986).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 11,004 (Supp. IV 1986).
127. 42 U.S.C. § l l,022(e)(3) (Supp. IV 1986). Delaware, Florida, Maine, Washington, and
West Virginia have established poison information centers which give out information on toxics
to the public. See RIGHT-TO·KNOW: A REGULATORY UPDATE, supra note 113, at 109, 114,
129, 209, 212. Illinois has established a Health and Hazardous Substances Registry and requires
the new Epidemiological Studies Division of the Department of Public Health to gather data
about hazardous substance use in the state. Id. at 24.
128. 42 U.S.C. § l l,023(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
129. The reported data are subject to the market influences outlined supra in Part Ill, which
may result in some distortion. Also, currently available statistics on domestic production and
consumption do not quantify how much of a chemical agent comes into contact with the population; rather they reflect only the amount potentially available for exposure. See Davis, Bridbord
& Schneiderman, supra note 11, at 296. These gaps will be partially remedied by the EPCRA
inventory, which will begin to identify the amount of chemicals released into the environment
and the locations where they are released. In addition, the EPA recently received a report from a
panel it commissioned to study the agency's need for data on pollution levels in the environment.
The report recommends the creation of an environmental institute, to be separate from the EPA,
to help the agency set up programs to monitor basic ecological systems. Problems with Data
Collection Hinder Efforts on Pollution, Experts Say, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1988, at C4, col. I.
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any person on a reasonable cost reimbursement basis. 130
The new laws require a widespread exchange of information, 131
and entail significant expense, particularly the start-up costs of identifying chemicals and exposures. 132 However, their benefits are likely to
be substantial.
The normative rationales for disclosure are also impressive and
standing alone may justify right-to-know programs. Right-to-know
laws articulate minimum standards of warning and informed consent
for hazardous chemicals. They are a logical legislative response to the
duty to test and warn recognized in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp. 133 The content and scope of the manufacturer's duty to warn
has been a major preoccupation of the tort system in the fifteen years
130. 42 U.S.C. § 11,023(1) (Supp. IV 1986). The first results from the inventory are being
released. Environmental groups have compiled the EPA data into reports on specific geographic
regions, focusing on air pollution as the largest category of pollution. Environmental groups are
distributing the information and calling on industry to reduce air emissions by 90% in four years,
as the Monsanto Company has stated it will do. Environmental Groups Compile Reports Based
qn EPCRA Section 313 Emissions Data, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 509 (1988).
131. One estimate of the number of MSDSs being prepared is 20 million, but the extent of
duplication is difficult to gauge. COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW NEWS, May 8, 1987.
132. The new laws require firms to invest in collecting and communicating information.
Both the EPA and OSHA have analyzed the costs of their rules. OSHA conducted an extensive
regulatory impact analysis in 1983. It concluded that the benefits of the hazard communication
rules will greatly exceed their costs. The total cost of the rules {present value) was estimated to
be $3,374 million, using a 10% discount rate over a 40-year period. Initial costs were expected to
be $603.926 million, or $43 per employee, with annual costs of $158.87 million, or $11 per employee. The total benefits from lessened health impacts, reduced search, and standardized federal
rules will be $6,141.821 million, discounted at a 10% rate over a 40-year period. Benefits in the
first year, $290.155 million, will increase to $1,050.782 million in the twentieth year, and to
$2,354.561 million in the fortieth year. See 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280, 53,327-29 (1983).
The EPA has estimated that the§ 313 reporting requirements ofTSCA will apply to approximately 32,760 manufacturing facilities and that an average facility will have four chemicals and
one mixture to report. The EPA's proposed inventory form would involve a cost of $12,467 for
the average facility in the first year and $9,427 in subsequent years. The bulk of the first-year
cost would be generated by the firm's initial research to identify its own toxic discharges. EPA
also estimated that only three percent of small businesses in manufacturing will have reporting
obligations. The costs to EPA for developing and maintaining the § 313 database will range
from $4.1 million to $14.3 million in 1988. EPA did not attempt to estimate the benefit of the
rules. Regulatory Impact Analysis in Support of Proposed Rule Making Under Section 313,
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, OPTS-EPA, May 1987. The Agency
is now in the process of comparing actual costs for the first year with its estimates.
These Agency estimates do not indicate the full benefits of these laws. Even OSHA's analysis
omitted significant potential beneficial effects, including secondary influences on manufacturers
and employers to substitute safer products and to support research in toxicity.
Some observers suggest that companies overestimate the costs of new regulations. A classic
example was the industry opposition to OSHA's vinyl chloride standards. Although the industry
predicted that compliance costs would reach between $65 billion and $90 billion, the actual cost
totaled less than $1 billion. In addition, the standard increased the industry's productivity by
improving housekeeping, encouraging innovation, and avoiding potential public health problems
caused by exposure to vinyl chloride. Chemical Hazards at Work: Whose Business?, 9 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 331, 345 (1985) {panel discussion remarks of Caron Chess, Right-to-Know
Coordinator, N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Protection).
133. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).

1830

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 87:1795

since Borel The courts most often have discussed information issues
in the familiar terms of the common law of torts: you have a duty to
warn others of a danger you have created; you are entitled to choose
the terms on which your body is touched by someone else.
The laws also appear to be justified on utility grounds. The economic function of disclosure is to correct the market failure caused by
the basic asymmetries of information, inherent in the chemicals market.134 During OSHA's hazard communication rulemaking proceedings, some industry representatives urged the agency to require
communication only of risk estimates. They argued that this would
have the same effect on workers' caution as more specific disclosure.
OSHA chose instead to require notice of chemical identity and all documented health effects. OSHA's approach puts workers, commercial
purchasers, and consumers in a position to make their own choices as
to exposure and to seek assistance in making these decisions.
A case history illustrates the way disclosure can work. Male workers at an Occidental Petroleum plant, which manufactured pesticides,
were talking over lunch and learned that none were fathering any children. Through their union they had sperm counts taken, which confirmed their suspicion of sterility. Because FIFRA requires that
pesticide ingredients be chemically identified, the workers were able to
identify their exposures. The union's researchers then were able to
specify three chemicals, including debromochloropropane (DBCP),
that were possible causes of sterility. When the workers raised the
subject· with Occidental, they discovered that the company already
had internal data suggesting that DBCP is a cause of infertility. 135
134. See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 70, at 491, 513; Reich, supra note 86, at 20;
Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 632 (1979); Schwartz & Wilde, Impelfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA.
L. REV. 1387, 1388-89 (1983).
As Professors Beales, Craswell, and Salop have expressed it,
information ·remedies allow consumers to protect themselves according to personal prefer·
ences rather than place on regulators the difficult task of compromising diverse preferences
with a common standard. At the same time, information remedies place the burden of
enforcement of quality on informed consumers in conjunction with marketplace forces.
This is often a more efficient enforcement mechanism, since consumers are constantly monitoring in the course of their market search, thus relieving regulators of this task. Firms then
self-enforce their own compliance out of competition-induced profit motives rather than
from the fear of government compliance actions.
Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 70, at 513-14.
For an application of the information economics literature to occupational health issues, see
Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1231. See also EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS -AN INVEST!·
GATION OF MARKET PERFORMANCE (1979); Viscusi, supra note 79, at 53.
135. Another source reports that the company doctor at the plant where these men worked
had himself conducted rodent tests indicating that testicular atrophy resulted from exposure to
DBCP. However, when the workers questioned the doctor as to why they had not been informed
of his test results, he told them that there was no evidence of such effects in humans and there·
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This conclusion was confirmed by tests at other plants, where workers
exposed to the other two suspect chemicals, but not to DBCP, wei:e
found to have healthy, normal sperm counts. 136 Occidental then substituted a new chemical in the manufacturing process.
This story illustrates how access to chemical identity data allows
the market, medical, and liability systems to function. Providing
workers with health effects and exposure information places them in a
position to seek assistance, to make choices about their own exposure,
and to negotiate for less toxic conditions in the workplace. 137 In addition, if the suspect chemical is a consumer product, exposure to toxics
may be reduced in the general population through increased vigilance
by manufacturing workers. It is not feasible for agencies to make
medical use of the data at the individual level and to oversee the myriad market transactions involving chemicals. Administrative agencies'
centralized collection and management of data is complemented by
distribution, which decentralizes responsibility for health and safety
and lightens the administrative agencies' burden of regulation. 138 Critics of right-to-know laws claim that these iaws will needlessly alarm
the public and ttjvialize warnings by requiring unnecessary notices.
However, individually and in groups, people already handle substantial amounts of complex information. Indeed, they are already called
upon by the economic system to estimate the health risks of chemicals,
though without the assistance of specific information.
It may not be necessary for all consumers or workers to be active
in using the new information to bargain for better product quality. A
small group of energetic "comparison shoppers" can have significant
fore he had no obligation to tell them anything. Chemical Hazards at Work: Whose Business?,
supra note 132, at 354 (panel discussion remarks of Charley Richardson, Mass. Commn. on
Occupational Safety & Health).
136. See FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 41, at 11-24.
137. Information exchange about job risks already takes place to some degree but the accuracy and efficiency of the exchange is limited. There is evidence that workers who believe their
jobs are risky are in fact paid risk premiums, but these premiums might be different if the workers were fully cognizant of the risks they face .. W. V1scus1, supra note 77, at 43-44, 93-113; see
also M. BAILEY, REDUCING RISKS TO LIFE (1980). Viscusi maintains that there is" a "quit"
response to risks that are revealed by on-the-job experience and that firms
reduce costs by
eliminating the job risk-quit response relationship. See W. V1scus1, supra note 77, at 64-75.
Viscusi also argues that the safety incentives created by market mechanisms may be considerably stronger than those created by OSHA exposure standards. He finds that a conservative
estimate of the total 1979 job risk premiums for the entire private sector was $69 billion, almost
3,000 times the total annual penalties levied by OSHA. OSHA penalties were only 34 cents per
worker, while risk premiums per worker were $925 annually. Id. at 44.
·
-·
138. Information remedies, in conjunction with marketplace forces, place part of the burden
for enforcement of product quality on consumers. This may be a more efficierit enforcement
mechanism, since consumers can monitor quality in the course of their market search, and relieve regulators of this task. Businesses may self-enforce out of competition-induced profit motives. See Beales, Cras_well & Salop, supra note 70, at 491, 502.
·
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effects. 139 This option may be most available with consumer products, 140 but it could evolve in other contexts. Unions and nonprofit
public interest groups have adopted this function to a limited extent,
by sifting through information and organizing to acquire more of it.
Third-party service providers of information services would be an
important development in toxics control. Professional environmental
services, such as the emerging environmental auditor, and consumer
and worker-oriented data and diagnosis services, could evolve as a
part of an independent market for toxicology, as the costs of exposure
are identified and as research to prevent harmful side effects becomes
more valuable. It is possible that a market in data could be sustained,
if the law supported it by funding research to satisfy the comparison
shoppers, both consumer and business. It has also been suggested that
once toxicity data is generally available, the incentives of chemical
manufacturers may be reversed, because lower toxicities will communicate an advantage. Voluntary testing and disclosure could become
the pattern in competitive markets.141
Disclosure of chemical identity also forges a new link in the liability system. It should affect the number and specificity of tort and
worker compensation claims and add to the incentive to screen products for toxicity. One OSHA official maintains that there already have
been visible signs of change effected by right-to-know laws. Before the
rules were enacted, workers typically complained to OSHA in only
vague terms about health symptoms. Complaints now refer to symptoms more specifically and connect them to chemicals identified under
139. Schwartz and Wilde have applied work on search strategies to consumer law and sug·
gest that "consumers who invest in information [Le., comparison shoppers] exert a positive (pecuniary) externality on those who choose to purchase at random - the searchers police the
market." Wilde & Schwartz, Equilibrium Comparison Shopping, 46 REV. ECON. STUD. 543, 551
(1979).
140. David Roe, a principal author of California's Proposition 65 and an attorney with the
Environmental Defense Fund, pointed out that results were prompt: "Several national snack·
food makers pulled back their products because they had excessive lead in them. Who ever
suspected there was lead in snack foods? I didn't." Hinds, As Warnings Multiply, Messages Are
Ignored, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1988, at Al, col. 3; see also Beales, Benefits and Costs of Label
Information Programs, in BANBURY REPORT 6: PRODUCT LABELING AND HEALTH RISKS 243,
247 (1980).
141. Viscusi suggests that a voluntary disclosure or "unraveling" process may occur and
continue until all the firms have disclosed or until a stable equilibrium is established, with some
participants withholding information. Unraveling is most likely to occur from the top down;
that is, the best firm discloses and others follow. Viscusi suggests that publicity of the conditions
in the worst firms is likely to have the opposite effect. See W. V1scus1, supra note 77, at 134-43.
He recommends disseminating information through government mechanisms that operate simi·
larly to right-to-know laws, but amplified by public or independent rating of safety levels. Once
measurements are accessible most firms will have incentives to disclose their health and safety
performance and to compete for quality in this dimension. Id. at 71, 84-87.

June 1989]

Information Economics

1833

the rules. 142 Insurance companies are also taking an interest in the
quality of hazard communication programs, regarding them as an indication of the insured's sophistication in preventing liability. 143 In
the tort area, the new notice requirements are double-edged. While
disclosure will help plaintiffs identify defendants and may prove causation, it will also warn potential plaintiffs and thus remove one of the
major grounds for toxic tort recovery. 144 These benefits have begun to
be recognized by the regulated community. 145
Right-to-know laws also will establish a more specific and broader
base of information for researchers. The EPCRA requires businesses
to maintain an inventory of each point of exposure to toxic chemicals
and to make this data available to researchers. This process is creating
a much more detailed record of exposure than has existed before and
should help to yield more specific measurements.
Federal right-to-know laws grew out of state ~aw experiments. In
the past few years, several states have established some innovative variations on the disclosure theme. The most celebrated - or infamous
- elaboration is California's Proposition 65, which requires businesses to warn the general public of any potential exposure to chemicals identified in the statute. 146 Another innovation, New Jersey's
Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act, 147 requires parties to real
estate transactions to assess the toxicity of the soil and groundwater at
the site, arrange for its cleanup prior to closing, and secure state certi142. See A Look at the First Full Year of the HC Standard Implementation and Beyond,
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RIGHT-TO-KNOW NEWS, May 15, 1987, at 6-8 (statement of Jennifer
Silk, health scientist with OSHA's Office of Health Standards). But see Staten & Umbeck, A
Study ofSignalling Behavior in Occupational Disease Claims, 29 J. L. & EcoN. 263 (1986). However, Staten and Umbeck focus on stress claims, which are more manipulable than other
symptoms.
143. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RIGHT-TO-KNOW NEWS, Mar. 15, 1987, at 10-11.
144. Chemical identity disclosure may also expand the liability of unions. See O'Reilly,
supra note 74, at 307, 320-22. But cf Hinds, supra note 140 (suggesting that most product
liability claims are not precluded by warnings).
145. See J. O'Reilly, Why OSHA Hazard Communication Offers You Real Benefits in Return for Its Real Costs, Presentation at Executive Enterprises, Inc. conference entitled Right to
Know: Bringing Industry into Compliance (Feb. 25, 1986).
146. "Proposition 65" is the popular name for the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CpDE §§ 25180.7, 25249.5-.13 (West Supp. 1989).
The law mandates that no business may expose people to chemicals that cause cancer or birth
defects without giving a "clear and reasonable" warning. The law also shifts the burden of regulation onto industry by providing that exceptions to the warning requirement are allowed only if
companies meet the burden of proving "no significant risk" of human cancer or, with respect to
birth defects, "no observable effect" at 1000 times the level of exposure. These standards are not
required to be set by the administrative agency, but industry has pushed for rules to limit its
liability, which might otherwise be litigated under the warning requirements of the law. Twentynine substances are now listed in the Act. Cal. Admin. Notice Reg. 87, No. 11-Z, at A-16 (Mar.
13, 1987).
147. N.J. STAT. ANN. § l3:lk-6 (West Supp. 1988).
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fication of the adequacy of the cleanup plan. New York State has enacted requirements that notice be given of potential exposure from
pesticide application prior to each occurrence. 148 Another trend is toward increased medical monitoring of exposed workers, such as that
required by New York's, and several other states', worker right-toknow laws; similar federal legislation is pending in Congress, 149 and
OSHA is considering promulgating medical monitoring rules. 150 The
New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized medical monitoring as a
tort remedy for townspeople exposed to toxic groundwater pollution.151 A related development is the emergence of a new environmental profession, the environmental auditor, whose function, in part, is to
act as an independent interpreter of toxicity information. 1s2
It is too soon to measure the impact of right-to-know laws. While
recent developments are promising, the market resources of chemical
producers and users are unequal. Small businesses, workers, and the
public-at-large generally do not have the financial means to purchase
data interpretations or comparisons. Also, even where toxicity information is available, individuals may not be able to act on it. Workers
are particularly vulnerable with respect to occupational health risks.
Geographic and economic factors limit their discretion to choose
among risks. Those who bear more general environmental risks are
often subject to the same factors; families rarely can move to secure
better air or water quality. The comparison shopper market will be
limited, not only by the transaction costs of organizing into a body
capable of reviewing and selecting among the research priorities, but
also by the high cost of testing.
Not only individuals, but small organizations, including local and
even state governments, have difficulty acquiring and managing this
data. The EPCRA is inadequately funded, even to accomplish its ex148. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW§§ 33-0905, 33-1003 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988).
149. A Senate filibuster defeated a medical monitoring bill, the High Risk Occupational Dis·
ease Notification and Prevention Act, S. 79, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 53,233 (daily
ed. Mar. 29, 1988). Its sponsors, however, may reintroduce it. See Bill Is Rejected on Toxin
Warnings, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1988, at A23, col. 1 (quoting the bill's sponsor, Sen. Metzen·
baum, as saying: "[A]s long as workers are kept in the dark about occupational hazards, we will
continue to try to bring them light.").
· 150. OSHA has initiated two generic rulemaking proceedings that would set new require·
ments for exposure monitoring and medical surveillance for employers. 53 Fed. Reg. 37,591,
37,595 (1988).
151. See Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987).
15i. Several states no~ license environmental auditors. Scagnelli, Protocol 3 WORKING PA·
PERS - A NEWSLETTER FROM THE INST. FOR ENVTL. AUDITING 5 (June 1987). See also New
Jersey's Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act, 'N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-19 (West Supp. 1988),
which requires companies to perform environmental audits and develop risk management
programs.
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plicit goal of preparing localities for accidents. The statute places primary responsibility on state and local governments which do not have
the funds to finance the transition into this new role. While computerized services are developing, many local emergency planning committees cannot afford to study their own needs nor to establish the
connections that would allow them to function. Instead, they are opting to take the data in hard copy, where it often sits in boxes unused.
The prospects for more active market participation in toxicity data
are substantially improved by right-to-know laws, but a central role
for public intervention remains unfulfilled. The legal system could be
designed to orchestrate greater and more efficient investments, in both
data production and management.

V.

REsTRUCTURING PRIVATE RESEARCH INCENTIVES

Dean Calabresi noted in The Costs of Accidents, 153 "[o]ne could
build a whole theory of primary cost avoidance in terms of incentives
to discover cures .... Usually, however, we apparently do not believe
that a different allocation of most disease costs would do much to spur
reduction of their number or severity." 154 Incentives to discover cures
can be supported in the chemical toxicity context, if the market's information dynamics are taken into account.
Among the laws which aim to stimulate private research, such as
the patent system and product liability 'law, two models provide for
direct funding of research. One might be called the "seed money"
model, a variant of which has been proposed to encourage research on
superconductivity. 155 In this model, public money is provided as an
inducement for research and development in a particular sector of the
economy, in the hope that it will lead to the long-term development of
marketable products. Another approach is to select a particular goal
and fund efforts to attain it. For example, Congress has enacted a
program to spur research on "orphan drugs," those which treat rare
diseases and therefore have little commercial value. 156 The orphan
drug program finds sponsors for research on rare diseases and pro153. G. CALABRESI, THE Cosrs OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970).
154. Id. at 44. Dean Calabresi suggests that occupational diseases and product-related diseases can be treated in the same way as accidents, in that they can be reduced in number and
severity by the same methods, including methods aimed at primary cost reduction.
155. Panel Asks Strong U.S. Push to Develop Superconductors, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1989, at
Al, col. 1 (natl. ed.).
156. See HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, REPORT ON THE ORPHAN DRUG
Acr, H.R. REP. No. 840, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3577.
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vides them with financial incentives in the form of grants and tax
breaks. 157 These approaches are useful where the need for the information is limited or as yet undeveloped. That is not the case, however,
with the need for chemical toxicity data.
Chemicals in commercial use, far from being orphans, affect huge
numbers of people and businesses. This circumstance provides opportunities for adjusting research incentives in the chemicals market. The
recent amendments to FIFRA and SARA recognize the option of
making industry pay for the research required by its externalities, but
these laws would simply tax the industry to finance limited government efforts and fail to take full advantage of market dynamics to
stimulate private production of data.
A more ambitious and promising approach would be to adapt the
design of the national hazardous waste clean-up program to foster private research sponsored by the users of chemical products. The current deficit of toxicity and exposure data is analogous to the current
hazardous waste problem. Both have hidden impacts and delayed effects and require costly public initiatives to remedy, and both are externalities generated by the same group of industries. In addition,
CERCLA attempts to involve all the parties who have an interest in a
site (whether that interest is past or prospective) and to provide those
who want to remedy the hazardous condition with the financial support to do so. This type of mechanism is needed to mobilize latent
forces in the market to generate more toxicity data.
Hazardous waste cleanup is being carried out pursuant to
CERCLA, commonly called "Superfund," and the 1986 amendments
to the Superfund contained in SARA. Pursuant to CERCLA, the
EPA has published a National Priority List, which identifies the hundreds of locations that require attention. The statute's Superfund and
liability provisions provide funding for the actual cleanup. The basic
fund itself is derived from taxes on the petrochemical industry and
from general revenues. Cleanup operations may be financed from thi.s
fund or by "potentially responsible parties" (PRPs), who, when identifiable, are held liable for clean-up costs. PRPs may be waste generators, or haulers, or property owners, or tenants - virtually anyone
associated with the presence of the waste at the site. The cleanup may
be carried out by local, state, or federal agencies or by private parties,
157. Id. Biomedical research takes place in three contexts: the federal government; non·
profit medical centers, which are chiefly in medical schools and are largely funded through the
federal grant system; and the pharmaceutical industry. In 1982, the FDA reported to Congress
that it had approved approximately 960 drugs for rare diseases. But of these, only 34 were
developed and marketed by companies; with 24 of these 34, a government agency or a university
had assisted in either the financing or the research. Id. at 3579-80.
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who then may seek reimbursement from the fund or from identifiable
PRPs. Most CERCLA cases are initiated by the EPA or state agencies which then negotiate for further involvement by PRPs.
The Superfund program thus combines three elements: (1) a plan
for action, formulated and published by the government; (2) a source
of funding that attempts to link the costs of cleanup to the parties
most responsible for the hazardous condition; and (3) open participation in the process, with financial support made available to any party
interested in undertaking to clean up a site. While the Superfund program has been criticized as unwieldy, some of its problems surely are
attributable to the nature of its difficult task. In any event, the design
of the Superfund is instructive as a model program to address current
chemical research needs, a program which I will call "super study,"
for lack of a better name.
In a "super study" program, research would be conducted according to a general plan, by a combination of private and public institutions.158 Private laboratories or government agencies could conduct
studies according to test protocols specified by the plan and then register the test results. The costs of different types of study could be standardized. Documented research, with peer r~view completed, would
be reimbursed from the general fund. Reimbursement to the fund by
chemical producers would be mandated when studies showed adverse
health effects from their individual chemicals or identified mixtures.
Basic screening and research, and methodological research, would also
be reimbursed from the general fund.
Reimbursement actions against manufacturers would be managed
by a separate custodian of the fund, so that research results would not
be influenced by the need to support the fund. Responsible parties,
producers comparable to the Superfund PRPs, could be identified
through the TSCA, the new inventory provisions of the EPCRA, the
registration provisions of the FDA, and the pesticide laws. Joint and
several liability could be established by law, with liability apportioned
on the basis of human exposure rates. Long-term epidemiological
studies could also be funded by dischargers, based upon the extent of
human exposure caused by their discharges.
A national study plan would be published and managed by the
National Toxicology Program, the National Institute of Environmen158. See Shapiro, supra note 76, at 175-82 (discussing possibility of both limited and complete third-party testing, either by the government or by independent contractors); CHEMICALS
AND HEALTH, supra note 9, at 96 (urging that serious consideration be given to supporting the
National Center for Toxicological Research with a contractual laboratory, associated with academic sciences, and perhaps through a consortium of universities).
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tal Health Sciences (NIEHS), or another suitable agency. It could be
managed as a more formalized version of the present national toxicology research agenda and grants programs, or it could adopt the National Research Council's recommendations for toxicological research
published in Toxicity Testing. 159 The National Research Council has
reviewed a variety of screening proposals and recommended a system
that would operate in several stages, selecting chemicals for further
research at each stage, based on their human exposure and potential
toxicity. 160 The Toxicity Testing approach is not the only planning
resource available, of course; the public health research community is
a ready repository of expertise in research management.
One basic appeal of a "super study" program, in contrast to the
Superfund hazardous waste program, is that the investment would
come at the beginning of the production process, when information
can be useful in many environmental and health dimensions. A research program's benefits would also be broader than the Superfund's
focus on hazardous dump sites, because much of the data produced
would be applicable across different media. The current Superfund
allocation of $8.6 billion for waste site cleanup is addressing only part
of a broader pollution problem. The amount of waste discharged into
other media, particularly air, is greater than that disposed in landfills.
The rationale for taxing the entire petrochemical industry to support research is also stronger than it is for hazardous waste cleanup.
Research would benefit the entire system, including the industry itself,
by providing a better basis for product screening in the marketplace
and by removing the pall cast over safe products by uncertainty about
toxicity. Moreover, a tax that is imposed on future behavior, before
159. See TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10.
160. In stage one, fragments of available information would be collected, including all indica·
tors of exposure, and fed into a computer program. A set of rules would be applied by the
computer to determine whether the levels of exposure and known toxicity indicators suggest that
further examination .is needed. If certain indicators were triggered, the chemical would then be
passed on to stage two, with grades keyed to priorities for further research. The grades would
also indicate the appropriate amount of funding to be spent on the research.
In stage two, the stage-one dossier would be reviewed by two experts, one in toxicity and one
in exposure. If no tests were currently in progress, each expert would design and conduct a
research strategy using currently available data. After considering all relevant factors, they
would make a recommendation concerning further study. Stage three would consist of a more
thorough assessment by a committee of experts. Stage four would entail actual field or labora·
tory research.
When these four stages were completed, the results would be fed back into the system to
check reliability. Final study results would be used by regulators and would be evaluated with
respect to public policy and their relevance to further refinement of the selection process. At
each stage, the cost of further study and the usefulness of the information to the regulatory
system would be integrated into the process. The stages would be coordinated, with the value of
the information as the primary consideration. See id. at 16, 205-26, app. A; NATIONAL AcAD·
EMY OF SCIENCES, PRINCIPLES FOR EVALUATING CHEMICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT (1975).
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the externality is created, sends a more direct signal to the industry
than the after-the-fact Superfund tax. Firms would be taxed for activities they can control, rather than for existing harms whose cause they
may not be able to identify. 161 The tax structure could be designed in
an innovative manner to encourage waste reduction. For instance, the
tax could be keyed to levels of waste or human exposure, rather than
production. The data on pollution discharges that would be needed to
implement this approach is now being pulled together by the EPA
pursuant to the EPCRA.
A research super study also should be easier to administer than the
current national Superfund program. CERCLA implementation must
struggle with a number of unwieldy obstacles that would not be present in the super study program. Chief among these obstacles is the
need to treat and to relocate millions of tons of poisonous and contaminated material. A research program would have few such logistical
problems because it would produce prospectively useful information,
as opposed to trying to destroy or neutralize useless, dangerous waste.
Each hazardous waste site is a complex ecological problem, unlike
the relatively standardized procedures in toxics testing. Waste sites
are located in a wide variety of natural and s~cietal settings, and can
be handled by several different technologies, and treated to different
grades of remediation. In practice, cleanup usually is too expensive
and uncertain for the proponent of the cleanup, usually a state agency
or the EPA, to complete it before seeking to involve PRPs through
reimbursement. Therefore, the agency initiates legal action against
PRPs and then litigates and negotiates the question of "How clean is
clean?" for the particular site. The structure of the situation leaves the
amount and the time frame of liability uncertain and allows disputes
to persist among potentially responsible parties, thus discouraging
enforcement. 162
A super study program could be designed to produce less uncertainty as to liability for study costs. Study costs could be standard161. See White, Economizing on the Sins of Our Past: Cleaning Up Our Hazardous Wastes,
25 Hous. L. REV. 899, 908-11 (1988). Retrospective regulation is no longer limited to waste
disposal sites. The Asbestos Information Act requires manufacturers of asbestos-containing
building materials to provide the EPA with information on the years of manufacture, the types
and classes of products, and other identifying data. The legislation is intended to assist the EPA
in regulating asbestos cleanup and to simplify asbestos "cost recovery" litigation brought by
owners of buildings constructed with asbestos materials. These lawsuits are often brought
against large numbers of manufacturers because the plaintiffs cannot identify the maker of the
particular product on which the claim is based. Congress Passes Bill Requiring Firms to Provide
Product-Identification Data, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 688 (1988).
162. See Anderson, Negoliation and Informal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund, 1985
DUKE L.J. 261 (thorough analysis of CERCLA's history and its lessons).
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ized, just as research grants already are defined and limited. If
reimbursements for studies were made from the general fund upon a
showing that the study was conducted according to defined research
protocols, liability for each study's cost could not be avoided by failing
to cooperate, because the study would be completed before reimbursement was sought.
An important issue in the design of the super study program would
be how to answer the parallel question to "How clean is clean?"; that
is, "How toxic is toxic?" As a threshold distinction, the meaning of
"toxic" differs in different testing and regulatory settings. An indicator of toxicity that suggests further testing is advisable may be much
weaker than the data required to impose a limitation on human contact with a substance. The super study program administrators could
select a formal means of defining indicators of toxicity sufficient to
warrant further study or warning. These judgments are already being
made in the course of administering federal research grant programs.
The National Research Council's work in Toxicity Testing suggests
that they may be further formalized.
This brief outline suggests that it is possible to redesign information laws to correct the present imbalance in the private research market and bring into play actors who are disadvantaged by market
dynamics. 163 A super study program could support research efforts
outside the present government and manufacturing framework. Labor
and consumer organizations and environmental consulting firms serving small businesses could take advantage of the program's reimbursement provisions to engage private laboratories to conduct research.
This would change existing incentives by presenting chemical manufacturers with the possibility that another party would produce information on their products or pollution. The prospect of third-party
testing would encourage businesses to do their own studies, to do them
accurately, and to curtail human exposures and substitute less toxic
chemicals to reduce any damage that research linked to their
chemicals.
163. This proposal would attempt to influence the market to attend more fully to public
research priorities. Another current controversy on the commercialization of science, particularly biology and biotechnology, centers on the reverse issue: the appropriateness of privately
driven guidelines for public supported research. The role of independent, noncommercial institutions in basic and applied scientific research has been the topic of debate during the past decade,
as many universities and businesses have joined forces to conduct research, particularly in
bioengineering. Perhaps the most radical proposal to combine commercial and public research is
the Reagan administration's suggestion that the NIH be converted into a private research center,
financed with money from the government, industry, and foundations. The proposal was made,
in part, to allow for greater support for the biotechnology industry. See U.S. Weighs Turni11g
Agency Into Private Health Institute, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1987, at Al, col. 4.
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Chemical toxicity is a complex phenomenon. Research is an unpredictable investment and we do not know if any national research
program would substantially reduce the problem of uncertainty in
chemicals regulation. However, since we are already investing in research and have designed much of the regulatory system to depend
upon information in order to function, the efficiency with which the
private sector produces and uses the data should be a primary concern. The law can be better designed to support private incentives to
produce toxicity and exposure data. The same can also be said about
the law's role in distributing data.
VI.

THE DATA SYSTEM AS A PUBLIC UTILITY

The history of chemical information services in this country is a
story of repeated flirtation with and hesitation over commitment to the
concept of a national data system. 164 In the late 1970s, in the wake of
the enactment of TSCA, an integrated national data system was
planned, but when the Reagan administration took office, information
policy shifted in a different direction. The EPA in particular has suffered from inconsistent goals and support of its data project. Both
private and public toxics data services are now evolving rapidly in response to new disclosure laws. 165 Meanwhile, basic questions about
what kind of long-term data resources the nation will have are being
answered on an ad hoc basis, without the benefit of a considered legislative policy.
Two current developments outside the field of chemical regulation
will shape the future of availability of this data. The first is the rapid
diversification of telecommunications which has followed the restructuring of the telephone system and is fueled by the continuing evolution of computer technology. 166 The second is the reassessment of
federal information policy, now taking place as government agencies
164. As early as 1962, President Kennedy noted:
The accumulation of knowledge is of little avail if it is not brought within reach of those
who can use it. Faster and more complete communication from scientist to scientist is
needed, so that their research efforts reinforce and complement each other; from researcher
to practicing physician, so that new knowledge can save lives as swiftly as possible; and from
the health professionals to the public, so that people may act to protect their own health.
Special Message to the Congress on National Health Needs (Feb. 27, 1962), reprinted in PUBLIC
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JOHN F. KENNEDY 169 (1963).
165. See, e.g., Cooper, Secondary Information Services in Science and Technology: A WideAngle View, 33 J. AM. SocY. INFO. SCI. 152 (1982); Perspectives on the Federal Government and
Health Information: Patterns, Impact, Expectations, 38 J. AM. SocY. INFO. SCI. 25 (1987); Williams, Electronic Databases, 228 SCIENCE 445 (1985).
166. Noam, The Public Telecommunications Network: A Concept in Transition, 37 J. COMM.
30 (1987).
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move from paper to electronic media. 167 Some of the major issues on
the congressional agenda in this area are equality of access to data,
coverage and structure of data resources, quality of information, the
appropriateness of duplication in some systems, and the proper balance between public and private services.
As information dissemination is receiving attention, the time is
right to design a data management and distribution system to serve
environmental, occupational, and public health needs. Toxicity information presents a special case for distribution, with both unique
problems and possibilities. Given the market disincentives to disclosure of toxicity, there is a basic role for the government in data
distribution.
The concept of the public utility provides an appropriate organizing principle for structuring that role. Widespread exposure to toxic
chemicals makes toxicological knowledge a "good" needed by many
sectors of society, but it must be developed and maintained in order to
be useful. The market for this data has characteristics which have
justified public utility treatment in other industries: a wide variety of
users or potential users, with differing needs and different abilities to
pay; even for those who are unable to pay, there are strong public
policy reasons for providing them with the service.
Traditional public utility regulation builds upon the notion of a
"natural monopoly," which is said to exist when the structure of an
industry is such that a single firm can meet the demand more efficiently than can several or many firms. 168 Toxicology is a resource
that in key respects is like the familiar utility services in energy, transportation, and communications. We normally think of utilities as
167. INFORMING THE NATION, supra note 36, at 209; see also G. BASS & D. PLOCHER,
STRENGTHENING FEDERAL INFORMATION POLICY: OPPORTUNITIES AND REALITIES AT OMB
(Benton Found. Proj. on Comm. & Poly. Options No. 6) (1989); J. SHATTUCK & M. SPENCE, A
PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVE ON INFORMATION POLICY (Benton Found. Proj. on Comm. & Info.
Poly. Options No. 7) (1989).
168. The legal notion ofa public utility has early common law origins, but began to develop
into its present form in the latter half of the nineteenth century. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113 (1877); Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089 (1930); McAllister,
Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest, 43 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1930). Today its
most important applications are to common carriers regulated according to statutory mandate.
See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, tit. III, § 301, 48 Stat. 1081 (1934) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1982)). An excellent history and analysis of communications services and their regulation is I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983).
Recent developments in the regulation of industries traditionally treated as natural monopo·
lies are discussed in TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION TODAY AND TOMORROW (E. Noam
ed. 1983); BREAKING UP BELL - EssAYS ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION
(D. Evans ed. 1983) [hereinafter BREAKING UP BELL]; see also VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION REGULATION, EcONOMICS, AND TECHNOLOGY (E. Noam ed. 1985) [hereinafter VIDEO MEDIA
COMPETITION]; DEREGULATION AND THE NEW AIRLINE ENTREPRENEURS (J. Meyer & c.
Oster, Jr. eds. 1984).
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large regulated monopolies which invest in real estate and hardware
and provide energy and carriage service. In an "information economy," an investment in the research and training necessary to accumulate and maintain useful knowledge may provide a basis for utility
status.
·
Moreover, the particular character of modern transportation and
communications utilities as systems, which increase in usefulness as
they connect different geographic areas and segments of the society, is
also applicable to chemical health information. Because toxicology is
a body of knowledge that grows, expands, and corrects itself as it is fed
with new data, it benefits from integrated communications channels.
As a system, it is advanced most efficiently by making data interconnections accessible to all possible users. The role of the database is
central because it supports inferences that affect the study of related
chemicals and also feeds basic understanding of the physical dynamics
of the problem. The NTP has declared:
The very body of NTP test data - an expanding body of comprehensive,
comparable, reliable test results - is itself emerging as a research tool
for developing or evaluating assay methods .... Toxicological characterization can be an immediate effective tool in prevention of chemically
induced disease; in the long-run, this growing body of data can become
its driving force.169

Computerization has made possible the linkage of toxicity databases,
has sped their development, and has increased their productivity. The
large amount of data that is being accumulated can be put to work if
properly managed.110
Data resources thus would benefit from a specific and coherent federal policy on toxicity data management. Instead, we have been investing in a fragmented system that is developing in a haphazard
fashion, according to principles that do not fit the character of information as a process or a product. A brief history of recent federal
information policy will be useful background for further examination
of the issues.
With the passage of the TSCA in 1976, the EPA was directed to
coordinate agency data activities and, in 1978, the EPA established the
Interagency Toxic Substances Data Committee to guide database development. The TSCA also directed the Council on Environmental
169. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PRO·
GRAM: FISCAL YEAR 1987 ANNUAL PLAN 2.
170. See Bloom, Introduction: Science, Technology and the National Agenda, in FRONTIERS
IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 9-10 (1983). Bloom, Director of the Arthur v. Davis Center for
Behavioral Neurobiology, the Salk Institute, stresses the importance to scientific and engineering
progress of the effective use of new communication technologies to research and development as
a whole.
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Quality (CEQ) to study and report on the feasibility of a uniform
chemical identification convention and an integrated data system. 171
The CEQ reported that, although coordinated data systems would
vastly enhance the federal effort to control toxic substances, no integrated network existed. Rather, more than 220 separate systems had
been developed by agencies involved in chemical regulation, "each
serving different needs and organized in a different way. Some [were]
sophisticated computer systems; others [were] simply manual files." 172
Data had been compiled pursuant to at least fifteen different statutes173 which were generally pollution or product quality control statutes that did not focus on data needs.174
The CEQ, in conjunction with the EPA and HEW, recommended
the adoption of a uniform chemical coding system and the development of a broad-based network of data systems, which it called the
Chemical Substances Information Network (CSIN). 175 The network
was conceived of as "a collection of discrete information sources
which employs identical or compatible communication facilities, file
structures, computer languages, or other means of retrieving data
from the multiple sources." 176 This "loosely coupled" network of various types of databases, rather than one central system, would include
"all major federal chemical databases," as well as private systems and
services. 177 Major components would include a directory of the infer171. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2609(b), 2624(b) (1982).
172. TOXIC CHEMICALS AND PUBLIC PROTECTION, supra note 29, at 21. The report
elaborated:
Timely and convenient access among these systems has been very difficult. Information is
often incompatibly described, categorized, and filed. One agency is frequently unaware that
needed information exists in another system. Private users of chemical information have
difficulty learning about or obtaining federally maintained information. Additional data sys·
terns are maintained by states, industry, and other private institutions without being linked
to each other or to similar federal systems. Although information may exist that would be
valuable in understanding and controlling certain chemical hazards, it may not be readily
available or usable for such purposes to scientists, public interest groups, and government
and industry decisionmakers.

Id.
173. See OFFICE OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CHEMICAL
REPORTING AND RECORDKEEPING AUTHORITIES (1978). Elsewhere it has been estimated that
there are 10,000 to 12,000 statutory provisions requiring the collection of information. See Bern·
inger, Some Reflections on Federal Policy for Secondary Information Systems and Sciences, 1945·
1981. 33 J. AM. SocY. FOR INFO. Sci. 161 (1982) (citing COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHT OF PRI·
VACY, U.S. DOMESTIC COUNCIL, NATIONAL INFORMATION POLICY: REPORT TO THE PRES!·
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1977)).
174. See Chartrand, The Politics of Information, 36 J. AM. SocY. INFO. Sci. 376, 377 (1985)
(citing CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV., U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, INFORMATION POLICY:
PUBLIC LAWS FROM THE 97TH CONGRESS II (N. Miller ed. 1983)).
175. See TOXIC CHEMICALS AND PUBLIC PROTECTION, supra note 29, at 24.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 25. As proposed by the CEQ, the network would contain two major divisions: all
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mation on each system in the network so users could identify the systems that would meet their needs. It would also contain "[c]hemical
identification data for an estimated one million chemicals with crossreferences to other files containing information on individual chemical
substances," and a reference system for toxicological data and other
relevant information.118
·
The EPA was to be the lead agency in the development of the network, assisted by the CEQ and the National Library of Medicine. 179
The EPA began developing a means of classifying data within the system, while the National Bureau .of Standards was charged with the
development of quality assurance measures for the system. 180
Both the EPA and the National Library of Medicine already had
experience in developing databases in this area. In 1973, the EPA began to share with the National Institutes of Health (NIH) the management of a network of twenty chemical databases; this network, known
as the Chemical Information System (CIS), was more limited than the
CEQ's CSIN proposal. However, by 1984, the CIS contained a wide
variety of physical and regulatory data on some 350,000 compounds.
This database was available around the clock for emergencies. Forty
percent of its users were federal agencies; the rest were businesses, universities, and foreign governments.181
In addition to EPA resources, the National Library of Medicine
has maintained a Toxicology Information Program for more than
twenty years. That program has now developed a number of online
information retrieval services, including the Registry of Toxic Effects
of Chemical Substances (RTECS), produced by the National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health. RTECS today contains acute
toxicity data for 76,000 substances. 182
When the Reagan administration took office in 1981, the CSIN
the data collected under TSCA in one and a subfile of all the nonconfidential data to be available
to the public in the other. Id.
178. Id. at 25-26.
179. Id. at 26.
180. Id. at 29-30.
181. See Fox, EPA Dumps Chemical Data System, 226 SCIENCE 816 (1984). Even as. the
largest service that provided such information in 1983 the CIS' total number of current hours
was under 7,000. See Williams, supra note 165, at 447. Today, as right-to-know laws are being
implemented, that figure should rise.
182. See Lindberg, Section IL Health Science Libraries. National Library of Medicine: The
View at 150 Years, 38 J. AM. SocY. INFO. SCI. 34, 37 (1987). The largest of the Library's online
retrieval services is TOXLINE, with about 2 million references and information on human and
animal toxicity studies, effects of pollution, and adverse drug reactions. The Library also maintains CHEMLINE, a file of more than one million names for chemical substances representing
650,000 unique compounds. MEDLINE is a medical information service of the same type,
which contains abstracts of biomedical information. TOXNET contains toxicological data re-
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was little more than a proposal, and it was quickly shelved. The new
administration's approach to government information services emphasized private management of data to a far greater extent than had previous administrations. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
directed that government information assets be commercialized and
privatized on a broad scale.
The Paperwork Reduction Act has been cited as the authority for
the OMB's attempt to control federal information policy. The Act
directs the OMB to supervise federal reporting and data collection, but
does not deal explicitly with data dissemination. 183 Relying on its interpretation of the Act, the OMB has issued a series of directives establishing a policy of cost recovery for government products,
prohibiting government competition with the private sector in information services or goods, and directing the transfer of many serviceoriented activities to the private sector. 184 At the same time that these
directives were issued, budgets for information development and services were reduced, particularly at the EPA. These decisions constituted a dramatic and controversial change in information policy. 185
Many information experts have complained that this policy has been
disastrous: user costs have increased dramatically; 186 numerous
lated to the environment, emergency situations, and regulatory issues. The TOXNET system is
"user friendly" and operates around the clock. Id.
Another major center of related databases is the National Cancer Institute. See Berninger,
supra note 173, at 165; Masys & Hubbard, Technical Information Programs of the National Cancer Institute, 38 J. AM. SOCY. INFO. SCI. 60 (1987).
183. See 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982).
184. See OMB Circular No. A-25, "User Charges," 52 Fed. Reg. 24,890 (1987) (Draft Revision); OMB Circular No. A-130, "Management of Federal Information Services," SO Fed. Reg.
52,730 (1985); INFORMING THE NATION, supra note 36, at 261-70. Critics have also charged
that the OMB has intruded into the substance of environmental regulation without legal authority to do so. Shattuck and Spence report that a congressional study showed that the OMB was
more likely to disapprove research projects with environmental and occupational health topics
than those that concerned infectious diseases. Research on worker exposure to dioxin and EPA
regulation designed to protect consumers and workers from asbestos were blocked based on
OMB cost-benefit assessments. J. SHATTUCK & M. SPENCE, supra note 167, at 17. Bass and
Plocher suggest that the OMB has failed to assist the EPA in its implementation of the EPCRA
national toxics inventory. G. BASS & D. PLOCHER, supra note 167, at 38-39. But see Steinberg,
OMB Review ofEnvironmental Regulations.: Limitations on the Courts and Congress, 4 YALE L.
& POLY. REV. 404 (1986).
185. See, e.g., Palmer, Effect of Federal Programs on Health Sciences Libraries, 38 J. AM.
SocY. INFO. SCI. 40-47 (1987) (citing a steady and disturbing decline in federal appropriations
for health sciences libraries). Some viewed this trend as part of an overall tendency of the Reagan administration to restrict access to information. See Group Assails U.S. Information Flow,
N.Y. Times, May 12, 1988, at C33, col. l (in the past five years, one out of every four government publications has been eliminated and government data is increasingly available only
through computer access and with high user charges).
186. See Smith, Online Government Databases: Into the Maelstrom, DATABASE, June 1988,
at 56 (citing two examples of changes in rates after privatization). AG NET, a system developed
by the Department of Agriculture, was contracted out to Martin Marietta in 1985. Before privatization, access charges were $60 a year, plus a $42 per hour connect charge. Costs are now
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databases that were not of immediate market value, but had research
value, have disappeared; 187 and, in the meantime, databases have not
been enhanced nor has quality control been ensured. 188
Chemical toxicity databases were included in the new policy. The
NIH reduced its support of the CIS to one part-time coordinator in
1982. In 1983, partially pressured by budget cuts, the EPA began to
consider phasing out all of its CIS management and coordination activities and transferring them to the private sector. The EP A's support of the system was reduced and input was frozen for nearly twelve
months: anyone taking over the system would face the very substantial costs of updating the database. 189
In early 1984, the EPA convened two panels, one of government
experts and one of private sector representatives, to review EPA information policy. The government panel, citing budget constraints, concluded that the CIS databases should be turned over to the private
sector, but only after a transitional period of federal guidance and support. The private sector panel suggested several alternatives, 190 but
basically recommended that the government continue to manage development of the system's data, while allowing most of its distribution
to be handled by the private sector. The panel concluded that the CIS
should not be required to become entirely self-supporting because
some valuable databases, which cannot currently support themselves
on the market, should have continued government support. 191 In spite
of the panel recommendations, the EPA decided abruptly to hand over
its databases to two private contractors, providing no federal support
for updating them. The OMB rejected a proposal to allow the National Science Foundation to oversee the transfer. Public and private
users criticized the action, arguing that the system would become
$1800 per year if accessed through the contractor or $25 per year plus $96 per hour if accessed
through DIALOG. The Federal Elections Commission also privatized its database in 1985. Online charges went from $22 per hour to $4,000 per year for unlimited access under the new
contractor. Id. at 60; see also Seghers, Computerizing Uncle Sam's Data: Oh, How the Public Is
Paying, Bus. WK., Dec. 15, 1986, at 102-03.
187. See Wolfe, Evolution of Contractor-Supported Health Information Activities, 38 J. AM.
SoCY. INFO. SCI. 71 (1987); Fox, supra note 181; Smith, supra note 186..
188. See Heller, The Chemical Information System and Special Databases, 25 J. CHEM. INFO.
& COMPUTER SCI. 224, 225 (1985).
189. Id. at 229.
190. See Life Systems, Inc., Chemical Information System: A Blue Ribbon Panel Review
(U.S. EPA, Aug. 1984) EPA - 200-02-80-002, PB 84-217777 [hereinafter Life Systems, Inc.];
Chemical Information Systems: A Government Panel Review (U.S. EPA, Aug. 1984) EPA200-02-84-003, PB 84-217769 [hereinafter A Blue Ribbon Panel Review]; Kadec & Jover, Transfer of the Chemical Information System (CIS) to the Private Sector, 9 ONLINE REV. No. 4, at 297304 (1985).
191. See A Blue Ribbon Panel Review, supra note 190, at 1-2, 3-11, 3-12; Heller, supra note
188, at 229.

1848

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 87:1795

more costly and would deteriorate.1 92 The two contractors then made
different plans for the system's future. 193
Diversity of formats and decentralization are now dominant traits
of toxicity information development. In the past few years, right-toknow laws have opened up a new market for data that has spawned a
variety of new information services geared to handling the Material
Safety Data Sheets (MSDS), 194 but an early move to standardize the
MSDS format languished after large firms objected that they were satisfied with their own existing systems.19s
The issue of a central data system has remained alive, however.
Indeed, the problem of how to organize and support data distribution
is more pressing today than ever before. Local governments and the
nonbusiness public now need data access in order to evaluate information being distributed pursuant to right-to-know laws. Federal agencies that must comply with hazard communication and right-to-know
requirements, such as the Department of Defense, are a major new
user group of this data. Several proposals fo meet their needs are being discussed. For instance, the Chemical Manufacturers' Association
has informally proposed that it develop and maintain a database.
Meanwhile, the General Services Administration is being considered
as a candidate to develop a system to support federal agency
compliance.
Federal information policy recently has been reviewed by the General Accounting Office and the Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA). The OTA issued a report on federal information dissemination by all agencies. 196 In Informing the Nation, the OTA concluded
that legislation is urgently needed to set the direction of federal information policy for the years to come. The OTA stated that the government is at a crucial point, at which the opportunities presented by new
information technologies are substantial, 197 but the stakes, including
the preservation and enhancement of public access to government in192. Critics of the move, "including members of the panels, now accuse the agency of using
the reports as a 'smokescreen' and ignoring their recommendations." Fox, supra note 181, at
816.
193. See Fox, supra note 181. Private firms now may purchase the data through the Na·
tional Technical Information Service (NTIS) and resell it to their clients. A description and
analysis of the NTIS is contained in INFORMING THE NATION, supra note 36, at 13-14, 295-319.
194. See, e.g., Heller, Computers in Chemistry: Numeric Databases for the PC. INDUS.
CHEMIST, May 1988, at 40.
195. Letter of James E. Brower, Ph.D., Manager of the Center for Assessment of Chemical
and Physical Hazards, Brookhaven National Laboratories (Aug. 3, 1988).
196. INFORMING THE NATION, supra note 36.
197. See id. at 163 (comparing the yearly cost of distribution of the Congressional Record to
depository libraries: paper copies cost $632.83, microfiche $83.62, CD-ROM $10.05).
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formation, 19 8 are high and need to be carefully balanced by Congress.
The OTA suggests that greater definition is needed of what are inherently governmental information functions, as is a better understanding
of the conditions for cost-effective contracting for information
services. 199
Toxicity and exposure data are a special instance of the broader
problem which the OTA addressed. While federal information policy
as a whole is being reexamined, legislators should reevaluate the CSIN
concept of the 1970s and update it with increased participation by the
private sector. Unassisted, the market will not produce an integrated
universal service to support the economic, scientific, and governmental
systems that use toxicity data, but a chemical toxicity data system
would be a resource of such long-term value that it should not be left
to develop on an ad hoc basis. National information policy should
distinguish between the resources the private sector can offer and
those it cannot, and design an approach to support and supplement
the market.
It was suggested earlier that data production, enhancement, and
maintenance exhibit characteristics traditionally associated with the
"natural monopoly" concept. Distribution of the data also has several
characteristics which may justify structuring the service like common
carriers. The telecommunications system illustrates how a data system might be designed to provide needed information services. The
new "open" structure of the telecommunications network - now a
"network of networks" - provides a model for adapting the CSIN
model to the contemporary mixed public/private information service
market. 200 Indeed, the telecommunications system provides a useful
analogy on several levels.
For example, there is a parallel between the capital investment that
forms a telephone company's rate base and the research and management n~cessary to develop a data system. Toxicological information is
expensive to produce and maintain. As data accumulates it must be
updated and the data must also be consistent in terminology and production methods. 201 Quality control is an essential and costly condi198. Informing the Nation surveys the many federal statutory provisions that mandate public
access to government information and recommends that Congress renew the commitment to
public access in legislation that would reflect the changing conditions and needs of the computer
age. Id. at 207-37, 255-60.
199. Id. at 269.
200. Noam, supra note 166, at 40.
201. See Williams, supra note 165, at 446 (noting that one commercial strength of Lexis and
Westlaw legal database systems is that everything entered in the database continues indefinitely
to have value). Patent databases are similar.
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tion of its value. Therefore, a service providing toxicological
knowledge must be based upon substantial long-term investment.
Training, equipment, and the existing information are imbedded costs,
analogous to traditional telephone rate bases. As toxicology evolves,
the nature of these costs may change. The early telephone system was
a natural monopoly by virtue of its reliance on buried coaxial cable for
transmission. The transmission lines were expensive and limited in
their carriage capacity, making long distance telephone start-up costs
similar to those of railroads. When the telecommunications system
shifted from cable to microwave transmission in the 1950s and 1960s
and most recently to fiber optics, the new technologies' increased capacity and lowered costs removed the underpinnings of much of the
monopoly rationale. Emerging biological research tools, computer-assisted statistical research, and medical breakthroughs may eventually
have a similar impact on toxicology. For the present, production and
maintenance of toxicological knowledge require substantial
investment.
This investment also requires at least some centralized planning.
Even the diversified market of today's emerging telecommunications
system is dependent on a basic shared infrastructure. 202 The underlying network was developed by the Bell System according to the vision
. put forth by Theodore Vail, the president of AT&T from 1907 to
1919.203 In the health sciences related to chemical toxicity, the federal
government has for the most part provided the affirmative investment
and stewardship which the market tends to discourage in this area.
Public health and environmental agencies have functioned as a loosely
coordinated consortium that invests in equipment, training and research; judges the value of data; fosters the compatibility of different
segments of the discipline; forecasts the future needs; and provides a
range of data services. Coordination and combination are key productive functions here. These are functions that private firms are in no
position to fulfill. However, federal policy has also failed to carry
them out consistently, in part because of shifting policies.
Another characteristic of toxicity data that supports the natural
monopoly analogy is the fact that there is little value in duplicating the
basic product. Repetitive bioassays or epidemiological studies are desirable up to the point that a scientific consensus is reached on the
toxicity of a chemical, but duplication is not an efficient response to
market preferences.
202. Noam, supra note 166, at 41-42.
203. Bornholz & Evans, The Early History of Competition in the Telephone Industry, in
BREAKING UP BELL, supra note 168, at 12-13.
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In addition, compatibility of data formats and terms is essential to
combining and comparing data. 204 But the market encourages diversity, rather than integration. Variety of format is the very quality that
data management firms offer in order to distinguish themselves from
competitors. This is their defense against use of their product by other
vendors, since the information otherwise is easily transferred. Small
services with overlapping databases are developing, as in the very early
history of telephone service in this country. Images of that quagmire
are evoked by one user's complaint concerning the division of th~
EPA's CIS: "The two data bases soon will not be the same. For me,
as an agency coordinator, it means we will be needing both. That
means twice the overhead and twice the work." 205 While the market
might eventually coalesce and provide the standard, implied services,
the seriousness of the present lack of information precludes a "waitand-see" attitude. With public health regulation dependent upon the
coordination of exposure and toxicity data, the current fragmentation
cannot be justified on the grounds that diversification is good or convenient. Current laws do practically nothing to encourage the development of coherence in toxicity data systems.
Distribution of toxicity data services also has characteristics which
are analogous to telecommunications. Data systems offer opportunities for cross-subsidies among various types of services. Different
groups with information needs - industrial hygienists, researchers,
consumers, public safety officers - will have different abilities and incentives to pay for the data. This capacity provides both pitfalls and
opportunities. One criticism of the OMB's privatization scheme is
that it institutionalizes public subsidies of private information services.
Subsidies could work the other way; however. In a properly structured or supervised market, data services could make use of this variety by establishing price schedules keyed to each sector's ability to
pay, with particular support for consumers, universities, and medical
services. 206 Subsidies by commercial users of chemicals would be appropriate in this context even more so than the telecommunications
204. See, e.g., Lindberg, supra note 182, at 39:
For decades it has been recognized that the major impediment to the development and
widespread adoption of broad computer-based information systems in medicine has been the
standard vocabulary, terminology, definitions, and criteria for recording the results of bi- .
omedical research and the events of clinical patient care. The result has been the inability of
any medical-information system to communicate with another. The [National Library of
Medicine] is working to remedy this deficit by developing a Unified Medical Language System ....
205. Fox, supra note 181, at 226 (statement of Laurence Dusold of the FDA).
206. The CIS service now offered by Fein-Marquart Associates has clients which include
government, businesses, universities, and public interest groups. However, the firm discontinued
its discount service for universities in 1988, and a substantial number discontinued their subscrip-
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system's subsidy oflocal service by long distance and business services.
Here the consumer's very need for the data is caused by chemical
firms' failure to internalize their health costs. Industrial rates might
appropriately subsidize consumer services. 207
The telecommunications model provides another feature that applies in this context, i.e., a two-way communication capacity. A welldesigned and well-supported toxicity data system could foster positive
interaction. It could collect exposure and medical data from health
professionals and industrial hygienists at the clinical level, while distributing important diagnostic and treatment toxicity information in
return. The tools and prototypes for such a capacity are already being
developed, as medical and industrial facilities are increasingly computerized and investing in communication with data resources such as
poison information centers and the National Library of Medicine
services.208
If we view toxicology as a service the public needs and therefore as
a potential public utility, with "natural monopoly" characteristics, a
variety of organizational options becomes apparent. The telecommunications model is the most elaborate. It would entail the establishment of a regulated entity that would provide a basic system, on the
common carrier model, from which other sectors in the market and
the nonprofit private sector could develop derivative services. Telephone service developed in the nineteenth century as a competitive
service,2°9 then as a complex regulated monopoly. In the past decade,
the telecommunications system has evolved into a mix of monopoly
and competitive services, all working from a shared infrastructure.
The most recent economic format of the telecommunications system is
similar in several respects to the CEQ's original CSIN proposal and to
more recent suggestions for the data system. Indeed, the private sections. The administrative job of keeping the accounts open was not considered worthwhile by the
firm.
207. The problem of designing a rate structure and, indeed, whether a system could support
itself under any rate scheme, is beyond the scope of this Article. However, the size of the system
would be a function of its resources. Also, the present limited system is heavily subsidized by
general revenues. With continued public support and an increase in private support, a basic
system which at least services federal, state, and local agencies, nonprofits, and universities seems
feasible.
208. See Lindberg, supra note 182, at 36-39; Hushon & Conry, Using the Micro-CSIN Workstation to Provide Chemical Hazard Information, in HAZARD COMMUNICATION: ISSUES AND
IMPLEMENTATION 176 (J. Brewer ed. 1986) [hereinafter HAZARD COMMUNICATION]. Hushon
and Conry list more than 50 factual and bibliographic databases usable in a chemical emergency.
The National Academy of Sciences has announced that it will recommend the establishment of
an informational clearinghouse on occupational and environmental medicine, so doctors can get
the information they need in a single telephone call. See Gap Found in Averting Workplace Diseases, supra note 44.
209. See Bomholz & Evans, supra note 203, at 7.
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tor panel that advised the EPA in 1984 on the options for handling the
CIS recommended that the government continue to produce and
maintain an integrated system containing all the most frequently used
files, those that are little used but have long-term scientific value, and
an integrated directory system. The panel suggested that additional
revenues for the government system could come from private enhancement and commercial use of the files with market potential. 2I0 The
OTA, in Informing the Nation, envisions a similar layered approach to
public and private use of federal data. 2I I
A mix of monopoly and competitive services could be fostered and
new environmental and health services could develop, making use of
the basic system. For example, the embryonic waste reduction movement, which encourages industries to reduce their use of toxic chemicals, relies on exchanging information about successful process
substitutes. This kind of an information service could be added to a
fundamental database. Product rating services and labeling, and new
data communication businesses, might also spin off as distinct
entities. 2I2
Regulatory models vary in their treatment of entry, rates, and interconnection.2I3 The specific strategies that could be borrowed and
applied to a toxicity data system are beyond the scope of this Article.
However, entry regulation may be unnecessary if a national basic service is guaranteed. 2I4 The new information industry vigorously opposes "government competition" and argues that government should
210. Life Systems, Inc., supra note 190, at 3-8, 9.
211. See INFORMING THE NATION, supra note 36, at 269.
212. See generally Freifeld, Labels and Material Safety Data Sheets in Hazard Communication, in HAZARD COMMUNICATION, supra note 208, at 39; Hadden, Labelling of Chemicals to
Reduce Risk, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 235 (Summer 1983).
The new information laws have stimulated demand for protocols of safe transport and use of
chemicals and information services, such as toxic chemicals inventories and environmental information clearinghouses. Government and private databases are being developed and made more
accessible. Local fire departments, which are being inundated with MSDS forms, are contracting
with consulting firms to manage this data. CHEMTREC, one of the largest emergency response
communication centers, contains about 230,000 MSDSs, and its 3,000 member companies can
access the database through a toll-free telephone number. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RIGHT-TOKNOW NEWS, Oct. 10, 1987, at 4-6. Region VI of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
has set up a region-specific, computer bulletin board on toxics. The database will be accessible by
telephone and by computer. COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW NEWS, June 27, 1987, at 4. EPA
will establish an expanded public database, which in its first phase will contain information from
the 140,000 to 160,000 annual release forms required by§ 313. See 42 U.S.C. § I 1023(j) (Supp.
IV 1986); COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW NEWS, May 22, 1987, at 1-2.
213. See generally BREAKING UP BELL, supra note 168; DEREGULATION AND THE NEW
AIRLINE ENTREPRENEURS, supra note 168; TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION TODAY AND
TOMORROW, supra note 168; VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION, supra note 168.
214. See supra notes 172, 207. The EPA is preparing distribution of a number of data products derived from EPCRA's new National Toxics Release Inventory. The agency will produce
and distribute to federal, state, and county level libraries data derived from the inventory in hard
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rtot enter the market where the private sector is already operating.
However~ some basic needs are not met by the market and, in any
event, the public ·sector is the main supplier of data that the industry
wishes to sell. 215 In light of the public source of so much of the data, it
is appropriate to consider making a federal agency the basic data service provider.
A simpler approach than system development on the telecommunications model, and one that is closer to hand, would be to authorize
and fund an agency - for example, the NTP or NIEHS - to study
the adequacy of the present data system connections and to provide
supplemental .services to those who cannot afford access to private
services or who need data not offered by firms. This is already being
done in certain areas by the National Library of Medicine and the
EPA. The supplemental services should be subsidized, either through
the sale of data to private firms or through a fund such as the one
discussed in Part V.
A narrower program - indeed, the minimum government role would be promulgation of standards to ensure compatibility and quality of data. There is precedent for standard-setting in the work of the
National Bureau of Standards and, in the private sector, in the American Society for Testing and Materials, which has actively sought either
legislation or a consensus on standard MSDS formats.
copy, microfiche, and CD-ROM form. Telephone conversation with Gerard Brown, Chief of
Nonconfidential Information Service Section, EPA Office of Toxic Substances (Jan. 24, 1989).
The federal government has long provided information and information carriage. Its constitutional mandate to provide a postal system is the most definite authority for this activity, but
broader, more substantive participation may stem from the commerce clause and, for the states,
from the police power.
· Professor Pool maintains that entry and exit controls in communications media are unconstitutional restrictions on speech. Pool, Comments on "The Future of Telecommunications Regulation'~ in TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION TODAY AND TOMORROW, supra note 168, at 68;
see also I. POOL, supra note 168. Would government regulation or provision of services in this
area raise first amendment issues? Although we are accustomed to thinking of "science" as an
academic pursuit, in its role as chemical hazard communication, it may be seen as commercial
information excluded from the ambit of the first amendment. The first amendment implications
are discussed in
CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS (1947), and T.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 697-714 (1970).
215. See Giving Public U.S. Data: Private Purveyors Say No, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1989, at
Al, col. 4. When the Federal Maritime Commission planned to make its electronic lists of ship·
ping rates accessible to anyone with a computer, private companies that have made a business of
providing this information to the public objected. As federal agencies move to put their informa·
tion on electronic media, it will become more accessible, thus bypassing firms that have been
packaging it electronically while the agencies were still relying on paper. According to The New
York Times, there has been no opposition to the idea of putting the information on computers,
but the OMB, the Information Industry Association, and the Journal of Commerce have opposed
allowing the public to dial in to the agencies to read the filings directly. See id.; INFORMING THE
NATION, supra note 36, at 207-36. More recently, the OMB has suggested that it will reconsider
its position. OMB Proposes Switch in Information Policy, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1989, at A28, col.
1.
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This discussion admittedly leaves open many issues: it attempts
only to draw the broadest outlines of possible systems and to suggest
that, as with data production, the law related to data distribution
could be structured to generate more efficient data use. Right-to-know
laws recognize and rely on communication as a powerful regulatory
instrument. Computers and information science provide tools that
could be utilized to achieve a level of exchange that would strengthen
regulation and improve the market's own screening functions. 216
VII.

SOME PROBLEMS AND PRINCIPLES

The information economics drawn upon here suggests that there
are better ways of investing in information than the present law encourages. This analysis has attempted to point out some directions the
law might take, if information production and use were to be given a
more central role in toxics control.
One major issue that has not been addressed here is the question of
how to treat trade secrecy in the context of a comprehensive information scheme. Current right-to-know laws provide some protection for
trade-secret information. Neither OSHA nor the EPCRA require disclosure of the identity of chemicals claimed to be trade secrets, ev:en
though the exempted chemicals are hazardous. 217 However, these arrangements do not seem satisfactory. On the one hand, firms would
prefer not to disclose va,luable information at all, since secrecy is fragile and may easily be lost. On the other, confidentiality agreements are
burdensome and may inhibit research and medical practice. · Exempting trade-secret chemicals on a basis unrelated to the purposes of the
information system may also have systemic repercussions, affecting
the development of research and information services.
The solution to the conflict between the two systems - toxics con216. See Access to Information: The Dream and Reality, 36 J. AM. SocY. INFO. Sc1. 383
(1985); S. ZUBOFF, IN THE AGE OF THE SMART MACHINE: THE FUTURE OF WORK AND
POWER 7 {1988) {discussing information technology as a tool for developing economic anc~
human potential of "work organizations").
217. Trade secret protection was one of the more controversial issues in the development of
the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard. The definition of "trade secret" in OSHA's final
standard is essentially the same as that of § 757 of the Restatement of Torts (First), which is
commonly used by state courts in adjudicating trade secret disputes. See 19 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1200(c) (1984). The Third Circuit rejected OSHA's earlier attempt to exempt chemical
identity data from disclosure by redefining trade secrecy. See United Steelworkers v. Auchter,
763 F.2d 728, 740 (3d Cir. 1985).
.
Some state laws provide for more government oversight of exemption claims than does
OSHA. See HAZARDOUS MATERIALS: RIGHT-TO-KNOW NEWS, Nov. 15, 1985, at 5-12;
RIGHT-TO-KNOW: A REGULATORY UPDATE, supra note 113. The California, Illinois, and
Montana agencies rule on the validity of trade secret claims as they are submitted. Id. EPCRA's
§ 313 requires publication of the fact of each trade-secrecy claim made in reports to the National
Toxics Release Inventory.
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trol and intellectual property law - will only come from careful analysis and compromise. 218 We do not yet know how big a problem trade
secrecy will be in the right-to-know context. The databases being developed under right-to-know laws will begin to indicate how large a
portion of chemicals in the market is claimed as confidential. 21 9
Separate from the problem of producing and distributing data is
the question of how the law should use toxicity data. Do legal standards for toxicity reflect rational and consistent recognition of the
value of this information? Not surprisingly, the answer is definitely
"no."
Laws may require five types of actions with respect to chemicals:
(1) mere disclosure of the identity of the chemical agent to which
humans are exposed; (2) warning of its known hazards; (3) testing to
determine hazards; (4) curtailing the exposure by reducing the discharge of the chemical; and (5) compensation for any injuries proved
to be caused by chemical exposure. Each entails different costs and
will affect differently the individuals exposed and the public health system. For instance, the monetary and social costs of disclosure, warning, and testing normally will be less than the cost of reducing or
eliminating discharges or fully compensating groups of injured individuals. One would expect the law to establish separate but graduated
tests of responsibility, tests that would call for different grades of proof
and would reflect not only the costs and benefits inherent in each action, but also established jurisprudential norms. Tort law and chemical regulation statutes contain legal standards for warnings, testing,
exposure, and civil liability, but they do not form a coherent system.
There are similar standards for very different activities and different
standards for the same activity.
For example, the standard incorporated in the TSCA which the
EPA must meet before it may order a manufacturer to conduct testing
on a chemical, is "may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health
or the environment." 220 This "unreasonable risk" test is similar to
218. See McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837 (1980).
219. In a 1972-1974 survey, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) asked 5,000 manufacturers for the ingredients of 85,000 products, but was able to determine the composition of only 40,000. The NIOSH survey determined that approximately 18,000
of these contained at least one OSHA-regulated chemical and a large proportion was claimed as a
trade secret. See Graney, Toxic Substances and Trade Secrecy, in PROCEEDINGS OF A NATIONAL CONFERENCE TO INVESTIGATE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 78 (1977). However,
initial figures for trade secrecy claims made to the EPCRA National Toxics Release Inventory
are much lower. Out of approximately 70,000 filings with the EPA, there were about SO trade
secrecy claims. Telephone conversation with Gerard Brown, Chief of the Nonconfidential Information Service Section, EPA Office of Toxic Substances (Jan. 24, 1989).
220. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b)(2)(A) (1982).
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language used for standards that determine actual human exposure, as
opposed to disclosure, warning, or testing. "Risk" is a relatively general concept. The amount and kind of information suggesting an "unreasonable risk" requiring further testing usually will not be the same
as that which would support making rules to limit exposure. Physical
similarity to a known toxic compound, with substantial levels of exposure, may establish the first, while a full-blown risk assessment indicating the likelihood of a significant number of cancers may be required
for the second. Most laws do not address the levels of information
required for regulation221 or differentiate among bases appropriate for
separate kinds of agency actions.
At the same time, similar rules often establish very different information standards for the same legal function. OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard and the EPCRA use different methods to
determine which chemicals are toxic and therefore must be accompanied by warnings. OSHA requires that manufacturers and employers
determine for themselves what hazards are posed by all of the chemicals they handle, and the rules define "hazard" very broadly. 222 However, the rules also presume chemicals to be hazardous if they appear
on any one of several lists of suspect chemicals which have been prepared by independent health research organizations. 223 Manufacturers may tend to rely on the agency-endorsed lists, which means the
open-ended definition probably does not expand the rules' coverage.
To the extent that OSHA requires businesses to engage in health effects research - even library research - the rules burden smaller
businesses. 224 The open-ended coverage also results in unequal distri221. OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard and the FDA's Delaney Clause are exceptions. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text (explaining OSHA's rule). The Delaney
Clause provides that if there is any evidence that tumors form following ingestion of a substance
that would be a food additive, the substance cannot be used in food. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A)
(1982). However, the two provisions illustrate the same point. Both require action based on the
existence of one scientific test showing adverse effects, but the two actions - warning and banning - are very different.
222. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1988). The term "health hazard" includes chemicals that are
carcinogens, toxic or highly toxic agents, reproductive toxins, irritants, corrosives, sensitizers,
hepatotoxins, nephrotoxins, neurotoxins, agents that act on the hematopoietic system, and agents
that damage the lungs, skin, eyes, or mucus membranes. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 app. A (1988).
223. See supra note 119.
224. 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (BNA), at 2148 (Apr. 24, 1987). The National Research Council of
the National Academy of Sciences has recommended that the U.S. Department of Commerce
develop educational resources to help small businesses acquire the information on chemical regulatory matters that is routinely available to large corporations and associations. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DECISIONMAKlNG FOR REGULATING CHEMICALS IN THE ENVIRONMENT
26. The costs of researching and communicating the results of all studies will discourage data
production and again discriminate against smaller businesses. If chemical identity were universally disclosed and a unified toxicity database were made broadly accessible, then single study
adverse effects could be easily revealed at the initiative of interested parties.
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bution of information to workers in different businesses.
The EPCRA uses two approaches to determine coverage. The
emergency planning provisions, sections 301 and 312, incorporate
OSHA's standard. The emergency releases provisions, section 303,
limit reporting to one list of chemicals and section 313, on routine
releases, uses another list. Using lists prepared by independent experts
is preferable to employer assessment, as it assures credibility, clarity,
and consistency. It also lightens the research burden on businesses
and allows them to focus on the task within their bailiwick: identifying sources of exposure.
However, now that these lists have been codified, they are unlikely
to be revised appropriately in the future, since the EPCRA authorizes
additions to its lists and to the incorporated OSHA lists only by
rulemaking. To be added to EPCRA's lists for reporting to the national inventory, chemicals must be shown to cause or to be reasonably anticipated to cause "significant adverse acute human health
effects at concentration levels that are reasonably likely to exist beyond
facility site boundaries as a result of continuous, or frequent releases. "225 This is a high standard for warning and is inconsistent with
the use of the right-to-know scheme. As with the TSCA's testing authority, the EPCRA standard for expanding coverage parallels the
standards for setting permissible levels of human exposure. 226 Standards for warning - as for testing - need not be as high as those used
to set exposure levels. Experience with the TSCA indicates that the
EPA will not be able to add to these lists without engaging in lengthy
review of the health effects of chemicals to be added and that private
resources will be devoted to keeping chemicals off the lists. 227
Warning and testing standards require some level of suspicion
about a chemical's health effects. However, where no data exist to
implicate a chemical, disclosure of human exposure has not generally
been addressed_ by the law. What should be the legal significance, if
225. 42 U.S.C. § l 1023(d) (Supp. IV 1986).
226. E.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1982).
227. The EPA has announced a policy for reviewing petitions to change the§ 313 list. See
52 Fed. Reg. 3479 (1987). The agency will base its review largely on the information submitted
by the petitioner. Id. at 3481. Even with the heavy presumption in favor of toxicity established
by the statute, this approach does not adequately account for biases in information presentation.
Indeed, because of the commercial incentive described supra in Part II, businesses seeking to
have chemicals removed from the list, rather than added to it, will dominate the listmaking
process.
Litigation concerning the lists of hazardous substances is already in full swing. E.g., Calumet
Indus. v. Brock, 807 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (oil manufacturers sought precise interpretation
of OSHA's carcinogen labeling requirement, but were denied standing); see also COMMUNITY
RIGHT-TO-KNOW NEWS, Oct. 22, 1987; COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW NEWS, Feb. 8, 1987, at
5.
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any, of an unwanted or unbargained-for exposure to a chemical not
yet tested for toxicity? Does exposure necessarily trigger any individual rights or interests?228 Is it of any concern to society if there are no
apparent ill effects at the time the exposure occurs? Economic analysis
suggests that the answer to these questions should be yes; but under
current right-to-know laws only chemicals that have already been
shown to have some toxic effect are covered by disclosure requirements. Like the regulation and liability systems, right-to-know laws
rely on the existence of health-effects data to trigger their affirmative
disclosure requirements. Of the approximately. 67,000 chemicals in
commercial use, only about 300 will be included in the EPCRA national inventory. A considerable number of chemicals are still "invisible" to their users.
The principle of favoring broad disclosure should be basic to information regulation. Catch-22 reasoning underlies the present de facto
presumption of confidentiality of much chemical identity data: exposure data will not be gathered and need not be disclosed, unless the
substance can be shown to be toxic. However, it cannot be shown to
be toxic unless its effects are studied, and they will not be studied if the
chemical identity is. not released. Common law principles support disclosure of chemical identity data. There are strong normative arguments for an entitlement to chemical identity data inherent in· the
exposure situation. 229 Indeed, it is ironic that there is such ethical
concern surrounding FDA guidelines for testing on humans, while
outside the food and drug context, uncontrolled human exposure to
toxic and unstudied chemicals is so widespread. Under economic tests
for assignment of liabilities and entitlements, a disclosure requirement
also fares well. Economic and medical transactions are facilitated by
provision of chemical identity, but the costs of these transactions are
prohibitive absent disclosure. The "cheapest cost avoider" is the re228. Do individual preferences have any legal significance in this context? Under the law of
battery, an unwanted or offensive touching is actionable, but if a contact is socially useful, it may
not be, even though it is a nuisance.
Statutes have treated exposure in a variety of ways. Ex ante regulation of food and drugs
requires proof of safety or low risk prior to exposure. This approach implies an interest in testing
before exposure, but does not disclose to the individual who is exposed. Some statutes, such as
the Clean Air Act, provide that agencies should release data in their files to those who request it,
if it concerns pollution and is not considered confidential by the firm it concerns, but agency
regulations may more specifically provide that health and safety data are generally considered
nonconfidential. 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c) (1982); 40 C.F.R. § 2.301(a) & (c) (1988).
229. The common law recognizes the interest in information that belongs to a recipient of an
unwanted contact or intrusion, such as an actual or potential chemical exposure or the more
standard tort of trespass. See generally R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY
OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986).
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searcher or the exposed person who can monitor and prevent health
effects more easily, knowing the nature of the exposure.
Selective application of disclosure requirements may also have undesirable secondary impacts on scientific research. Data collection
based on proven toxicity channels scientific and economic resources
along lines which may be neither the most protective nor the most
efficient. If exposure data is not fully available, research and regulatory resources may be allocated to chemicals that are less toxic, while
chemicals that are still "invisible" are ignored. Investments in labeling, training, and medical care, as well as research in health effects,
inadvertently may be guided to chemicals of lesser toxicity, if disclosure requirements are not consistently applied.
Comprehensive disclosure is important because information
behaves like the system it is; it does not consist of objects like conventional products. This systemic character of information gives rise to
other imperatives for information strategies in toxics regulation. Access to chemical identity data facilitates the evolution of independent
producers, interpreters, and verifiers of complex data. Access rights to
information should be clear and the information should be available to
all the relevant players to encourage the entry of those who do have
incentives to provide information. Following the CERCLA model,
those with incentives to produce the cost-reducing information should
be linked to the most appropriate economic source of financial support
for data production. Here, as with hazardous waste, that source is the
activity which causes human exposure to risky chemicals and produces the need for health data. Regulation designed to foster production and use scientific information must also incorporate unity of
format, interconnection, and access to basic repositories of data. This
unity is a prerequisite to communication and makes possible not only
the development of new knowledge, but also standards and rating systems. Incentives to distort or minimize the negative commercial implications of information can be controlled, at least partially, by
disclosure of simple, nonmanipulable data, such as chemical identity.
CONCLUSION

Technologies that cause disease and environmental damage impose
special burdens on the economy and the public. Just as certain benefits are "public goods" in that everyone cannot help but benefit from
them, certain costs may be termed "collective bads." 230 Uncertainty
about chemical toxicity has been so widely and successfully external230. See Barry & Hardin, supra note 51, at 31-33; Barry & Hardin, supra note 50, at 181-84.
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ized that it is now a "collective bad." Present toxics laws are designed
to rely on information, but the costs of uncertainty and of arranging
for identification, study, and cure have been left to the public. At the
same time, the market dynamics that discourage private production of
toxicity information have shaped law and science policy. The notion
of "uncertainty" itself and the ways it is expressed in regulation have
been influenced by economic factors. Health and environmental laws
can pe written with these influences more consciously in mind and
research and dialogue at a much higher level - both of volume and
sophistication - than exists today could be produced. The words of
Samuel Johnson express the spirit that should inform the law:
"Knowledge is of two kinds. We know a subject ourselves, or we
know where we can find information upon it." 2 31

231. I J. BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 558 (1791) (Everyman ed. 1906).

